Defensive Realism and Chinese Maritime Strategy by Douglas, James
















submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington 
in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 





































The development and recent operations of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is one of the most 
pressing issues in the security structure of Asia. Discussions of both the Chinese Navy and China’s rise 
generally continue to be dominated by offensive realist thinking. This theory sees China as a state seeking 
power, and eventually hegemony, in its region. However, defensive realism is a more nuanced explanation 
of China’s rise and the operations of its navy. Defensive realism sees states as seeking security rather than 
power, valuing what they have more than what they desire.  
The PLAN itself was founded in 1949 and has evolved in its focus throughout its existence. First the PLAN 
was focused on defending against attacks from Taiwan, then defending against a possible attack by the 
Soviet Union. After the cementing of the US-Sino relationship towards the end of the Cold War, and the rise 
of Deng Xiaoping and his economic liberalisation, the PLAN lost much of its purpose and funding which had 
always been minimal.  
The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995, along with other conflicts like the first Gulf War and the Kosovo War, 
reprioritised the navy and the need to defend against possible US intervention. This turn to the navy was 
heightened by economic, resource, energy and regime motivations. This has lead to an effort to modernise 
a PLAN fleet which was aging and incapable of what was now required of it. This modernisation is ongoing, 
and it is still to produce a navy which is an entirely modern and near the capability of other comparable 
forces. The development of para-military maritime forces is one of the most telling aspects of China’s 
maritime development.  
China’s navy has engaged in two operations overseas in the past decade; anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of 
Aden since 2005, and assisting in the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya in 2012. These two 
operations are not indicative of a new global role, and are instead born of the unique circumstances of the 
two situations. More telling are the exercises that the PLAN has engaged in since 2010, these show the 
PLAN’s developing ability to defend territorial claims, such as the South China Sea and Taiwan.  
There have also been a series of incidents at sea between China and other disputant states over maritime 
territory. These incidents take a different shape based on the military capabilities of the other state. South 
Korea and Japan can monitor these areas with large militaries, and so actions by China are low key. In 
comparison, claimant states in the South China Sea have ships harassed, primarily by the ships of para-
military maritime organisations. This harassment is a strategy by China to ensure a secure claim to these 
areas under international law by asserting jurisdiction. Such a strategy serves to defend China’s claim and 
prevent a negotiated settlement on anything but its own terms. Thus China’s maritime strategy is based on 
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The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is an institution that can attract media attention like 
few other components of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In 2008 the dispatch of two 
destroyers and a resupply vessel signalled to many the coming of age of the PLAN, attracting large 
amounts of media reports and academic comment. The destroyers, Luyang I and II class missile 
destroyers, commissioned in 2004 and 2005 respectively, were some of the most modern ships in 
the Chinese fleet. Both ships are armed with a range of anti-ship and anti-air missiles, and the 
Luyang II class also has the capability to launch land-attack cruise missiles. As warships, they were 
more than capable of fending off Somali-pirates with rocket propelled grenades and assault rifles.  
Another constant magnet for attention to the Chinese Navy is the ex-Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag, 
which began undertaking sea trials in 2011 and finally entered service in 2012 as the Liaoning. This 
Admiral Kuznetsov class ship has been in extended refit since it was acquired by the Chinese Navy 
in 2005, requiring the instillation of weapons systems, electronics, and (according to some sources) 
engines. The only other ship of the class currently in service belongs to the Russian Navy. It is the 
Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov (abbreviated to Admiral Kuznetsov) and is capable of 
carrying 28 modern fighter aircraft, along with helicopters to support operations. Without context, 
these ships and the deployment to Somalia would indicate that the PLAN is developing into a 
modern, highly capable navy with the ability to operate relatively well out of China’s immediate 
area. 
This is however a flawed picture of Chinese maritime strategy and the PLAN, based largely on the 
assumptions of offensive realism. This research paper seeks a fuller understanding of Chinese 
maritime strategy based on the development of China’s maritime forces and their recent 
operations. It also seeks to determine whether these developments adhere to the expectations of 
defensive realism. By examining the history and current state of the PLAN, we can see that 
historically it has been orientated in defence of territory that China considers its own and remains 
so. Furthermore, it is a force that is in need of its current modernisation programme. By also 
looking at the recent operations of the PLAN and China’s paramilitary organisations, we gain a 
valuable insight into the shape of China’s maritime strategy, particularly in regard to the territorial 
disputes that China is currently engaged in. These two areas will allow us to gain a clear 
perspective on China’s maritime strategy, showing it to be orientated towards pursuing security 
rather than power.  
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This research paper is focused on China’s maritime strategy and in doing so attempts to avoid a 
US-centric view of the competition, or overly focusing on US or other views of legitimacy in 
territorial disputes. Much of the literature on China’s rise is focused on the US reaction, 
particularly with the rebalancing towards Asia currently underway. Such a focus often ignores key 
facts on China’s rise, something this paper seeks to correct. This focus on Chinese strategy is also 
important in ensuring that China’s perceptions, as well as its actions, are taken into account. The 
key example of this is in the South China Sea, China believes it has a legitimate claim to the area, 
and whether or not this claim is viewed by others as legitimate is immaterial to Chinese strategy.  
The growth and modernisation of the Chinese navy is a fact of life that states in the region will 
have to live with. How they choose to do this will be important, particularly in regards to the 
territorial disputes that China is involved with. The development of the PLAN is part of a Chinese 
quest for security, one that is in line with defensive realist expectations of Chinese strategy and 
actions. The development of the Chinese maritime forces is intended to defend areas that the 
Chinese government considers its territory, such as the South China Sea and Taiwan, thus ensuring 
security for the state.  Meanwhile, the PLAN also conducts anti-piracy operations and 
humanitarian evacuation in order to develop the PLAN and demonstrate to domestic audiences 
that the Chinese military is as world class as the propaganda claims, and that it is prepared to 
guard China’s interests which now span the world. This Chinese strategy is in lines with the 
expectations of defensive realism and shows it to be a more useful theory for the analysis of the 
international dynamics at play in Asia than offensive realism.  
In order to achieve the goals of this paper it will begin with a review of the current literature on 
the PLAN and its development, as well as Chinese naval policy overall. This will be undertaken to 
both identify weaknesses in the current literature on the Chinese Navy, as well as to bring readers 
up to speed on the current state of the debate. The literature review will also address the current 
theoretical perspectives that dominate the debate on China and how these play into the different 
narratives portrayed in the literature. This review will also look at the international relations 
theories which are brought to bear and to clearly present the theory of defensive realism, which 
will be used to analyse Chinese actions in the maritime realm. 
The second chapter will overview the history of the PLAN since its foundation in 1950, up to the 
beginning of the modern period in its development, signalled by the end of the Taiwan Straits 
crisis in 1996. This will look at the maritime history of China prior to the PRC, the broad strategy of 
the PLAN and the priority it received in the PLAs funding. This will serve to give context to the 
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modernisation that the PLAN has undergone in the past two decades and establish the constraints 
that are still present on the PLAN due to its history. It will also show a historical focus on 
maintaining security for the Chinese state against a variety of threats.  
The third chapter will look specifically at the current modernisation of the PLAN. This will begin by 
discussing the motivations behind the modernisation of the PLAN. This section will then look at 
the sources of Chinese naval platforms and technology, both foreign and domestic. The 
composition of the current Chinese fleet and the new platforms and capabilities that the PLAN is 
developing will be discussed, as well as efforts to enhance the professionalism of the service and 
the level of knowledge in its sailors and officers. China’s future aircraft carriers will be examined, 
as well as the expansion of China’s paramilitary maritime organisations. The development of the 
Chinese navy will also be compared to two other naval forces in the region, Japan and Vietnam, so 
as to put China’s expansion in some context. From this we can see that the Chinese navy is in need 
of modernisation if it is to replace its aging and obsolete fleet that can be a danger to those 
serving aboard.  
Chapter four will look at the recent operations and exercises undertaken by the Chinese navy, 
particularly the missions undertaken off the coast of Somalia combating piracy starting in 2008 
and the dispatch of a warship to assist in the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Libya in early 
2011. Of particular interest for the analysis of the PLAN are the motivations of the Chinese 
government for undertaking these deployments, the conduct of them, any shortcomings in PLAN 
capacity identified, the results of interactions with other states and institutions, and what lessons 
or intelligence the Chinese gain from the missions. The operations off the coasts of Somalia and 
Libya are not indicative of a new global military role for the PLAN, rather any out of area 
operations will be limited to military operations other than war. Recent exercises do show that the 
PLAN is now able to regularly operate task forces out into the second island chain, a notable 
increase in its overall capability. 
The paper will then look at incidents at sea involving both the PLAN and Chinese paramilitary 
organisations. These incidents are important as they are reflective of both China’s interpretation 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and China’s strategy towards 
disputed territories, such as the South China Sea and Senkaku Islands. In looking at these incidents, 
we can see a Chinese strategy that is driven by a desire to ensure negations over the future of 
these regions take place in conditions most favourable to China. These incidents at sea are 
indicative of a state seeking security and defending its claim to territory.  
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The last aspect of Chinese maritime operations and strategy that will be examined is incidents at 
sea and territorial disputes. These two matters are closely linked, as many of the incidents 
between Chinese and foreign vessels are carried out in order to reaffirm China’s claim to regions 
such as the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands. Examining these incidents highlights the 
expanding role of China’s paramilitary maritime organisations and their role in maintaining the 
claim Chinese jurisdiction, particularly in the South China Sea. The incidents are reflective of both 
China’s interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and 
China’s strategy towards disputed territories and waterways. In looking at these incidents we can 
see a Chinese strategy that is driven by a desire to ensure negations over the future of these 
regions take place in conditions most favourable to China. Incidents at sea between Chinese and 
foreign vessels are indicative of a security seeking state that is defending its claim to territory. 
The paper will then conclude by examining the possibilities for a settlement of the disputes 
between China and its maritime neighbours. This will include the role that the USA can play in 
shaping an outcome based on international law rather than bilateral negotiations. It will also 
comment on how defensive realism can be further developed to improve its usefulness in 
















The current literature on the development of the Chinese navy has two main arguments. The first 
largely conforms to the ‘China Threat’ argument, which also includes offensive realist theory. The 
China Threat school argues that China is developing military, and particularly naval, forces to 
prevent the US interfering in a conflict in China’s maritime environment, possibly over the status 
of Taiwan. The second school of thought is slightly broader in its arguments but basically states 
that the Chinese navy is not as grave a threat as it is often presented and is more in line with 
defensive realist thinking. This is either due to persistent weakness in the PLAN or because the 
Chinese government does not have hegemonic ambitions. These two positions will be reviewed 
more extensively in the following section. This literature review will also discuss three 
predominant theoretical perspectives on international relations, setting out the theory that will be 
tested against the actions of China, defensive realism. 
China Threat 
The first overall argument that will be reviewed is the China threat argument. This argument is 
developed mostly from offensive realist thinking, primarily of US origin, about the rise of China, 
seeing China as a rising potential hegemon that will be building a military that is capable of 
challenging the current dominant power in Asia, the USA.  Its origins can be traced to and  Richard 
Bernstein and Ross H. Munro’s The Coming Conflict with China.1 At times this argument can be 
quite overstated in tone, this being seen in a piece written by Vitaliy Pradun.2 In his article, Pradun 
outlines developments in Chinese cruise and ballistic missile technology which he believes can be 
used to prevent an intervention by the US Navy in the event of a war between China and Taiwan. 
This access denial strategy would involve the use of large numbers of cruise and anti-ship ballistic 
missiles at long ranges to overwhelm US Navy ships defences and inflict enough damage to 
prevent their involvement in a conflict. Pradun’s view is both extreme and flawed. If a conflict such 
as the one that Pradun posits were actually to take place, then the US is unlikely to send in its 
surface ships into the region without first crippling the Chinese military infrastructure that is 
required to undertake such a strike. Instillations such as over the horizon radar stations, which 
would be required to target an anti-ship ballistic missile, are large and obvious targets that would 
                                                            
1
 Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki, "The Rise Of "China Threat" Arguments" (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2009), 118 
- 19, 63 - 64. 
2
 Vitaliy O. Pradun, "From Bottle Rockets to Lightning Bolts: China's Missile Revolution and PLA Strategy against U.S. 
Military Intervention," Naval War College Review 64, no. 2 (2011). 
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be slated for attack in the opening stages of a war.3 The adaptability of the US military in the face 
of the Chinese military is a key factor in an article by James Kraska.4 Kaska’s article, ‘How the 
United States Lost the Naval War of 2015’ , is similar in tone to Pradun, outlining how China’s 
developing naval and other military capabilities could be used in a future conflict to prevent US 
forces approaching the Chinese mainland. Unlike Pradun, Kraska also discusses technologies that 
the US could develop to prevent such an outcome. Kraska stresses that such investment in 
technology needs to be undertaken by the US military in order to balance against developing 
Chinese capabilities. These articles are two of the most alarmist in saying that China already has, 
or is close to having, the capability to prevent the US navy from operating in its region. They 
represent the height of the China threat argument.  
A slightly less alarmist view is presented By Richard Fisher in his 2008 book, China’s Military 
Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach. Fisher argues that China is developing 
power projection capabilities, not only at sea, but also on the land. He uses the example of a 
recent military exercise held between Russia and China in Central Asia (Peace Mission 2007) 
characterising it as a dress rehersal for possible intervention in the region to prevent the 
emergence of democratic governments. Fisher sees the future role of the Chinese Navy as being 
similar, a force that can project power to distant shores in order to intervene in other countries 
affairs. Due to this focus on a force based on power projection, Fisher concentrates on three areas 
of the PLAN; aircraft carriers, aphibious platforms, and non-nuclear cruise missiles in a precision 
land attack role.5 The focus on these three key area has some major flaws. The most glaring being 
Fishers invention of a new type of aircraft carrier, conventional take off and landing (CTOL). CTOL 
is a designation given to aircraft, not aircraft carriers. Also important, amphibious and aircraft 
carrier operations can only be undertaken with control of the surrounding battlespace; above, on, 
and under the water. This requires the development of a supporting fleet that is capable of 
dominating all these areas, which in many ways presents as great a challenge as mastering flight 
operations off an aircraft carrier, but is a requirement that Fisher fails to address.6  An interesting 
point that Fisher raises is the role of nationalism in the modernizing of the Chinese Navy, painting 
the development of the navy as part of a drive to reverse the humiliation suffered at the hand of 
                                                            
3
 Jan van Tol, Airsea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, 2010), 58-60. 
4
 James Kraska, "How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015," Orbis 54, no. 1 (2010). 
5
 Richard D. Fisher, Jr., China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach (Westport: Praeger 
Security International, 2008), 174, 83-99. 
6
 Nan Li and Christopher Weuve, "China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: An Update," Naval War College Review 63, no. 1 
(2010): 15 - 17, 20 - 25. 
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foreign powers in the past.7 While only briefly addressed in this work, it is a theme addressed to a 
greater extent by other authors.   
The role that nationalism and particularly prestige strategies, strategies used to reinforce the 
regimes domestic legitimacy, plays in the modernisation of the PLAN is a question that is 
addressed by Robert Ross. In an artcle on the subject, Ross argues that China’s naval 
modernisation is a suboptimal use of defence dollars, given that China is a continental power 
ringed by potential adversaries. Rather than being driven by a real strategic need for a powerful 
navy with a blue water capability, the growth and modernisation of the PLAN is being driven by 
the demands of Chinese nationalists that see the creation of a powerful navy as a requirement for 
China to take its place as a great power. He states that China is not reliant on maritime trade to 
any meaningful degree, and therefore the defence of its sea lanes of communication (SLOC), a 
common reason given for China’s naval modernisation, is not a task that the navy need concern 
itself with.8 Perhaps the most interesting idea put forward in Ross’ article is that the 
modernisation of the PLAN represents not just a threat to China’s neighbours or to the stability of 
Asia, it represents a threat to China itself. By creating tension with the USA, diverting funding from 
other components of the PLA, and by creating valuable but not well defended targets, the PLAN is 
more of a hazard than an asset to China and its military.9 Ross’s assessment drew criticism from 
Michael Glosny and Phillip Saunders. Glosny and Saunders dispute Ross’s claims in the areas of 
continental threats and the importance of SLOC to the Chinese economy. Whereas Ross sees 
potential conflict stemming from China’s land boarders, Glosny and Saunders state that China’s 
land borders are stable and becoming even more so as China continues to settle border disputes. 
At the same time as the borders are stabilising, the threats that the PLAN are having to prepare for 
are increasing. China relies heavily on the import of oil for its transport sector and relies on the 
import of raw materials and export of finished products, all done by sea, in order to maintain its 
economic strength.10 In response to Ross’s argument that the Chinese navy is a threat to Chinese 
security, the authors also point out that the US fleet is not the only potential adversary of the 
PLAN, and that while the Chinese fleet may be incapable of winning a conflict with the US, it will 
be useful to increase: 
                                                            
7
 Fisher, China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, 184. 
8
 Robert S. Ross, "China's Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response," International Security 34, no. 
2 (2009): 46, 55 - 58, 65 - 69. 
9
 Ibid.: 75 - 77. 
10
 Michael A. Glosny, Phillip C. Saunders, and Robert S. Ross, "Debating China's Naval Nationalism," International 
Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 161 - 63. 
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“China’s ability to defend regional interests in contingencies not involving the United States, 
to protect expanding overseas interests, to perform nontraditional missions, to conduct 
military diplomacy, to demonstrate international responsibility, and to increase China’s 
prestige.”11  
These roles for the PLAN, outside of conflict with the current dominant power in the region, are 
important for understanding and analysing the future trajectory of the Chinese Navy. The ability of 
nationalist sentiment to influence the development of the navy is also questioned as there is no 
decision making process within the Chinese government that can be seen to factor in the 
nationalist sentiment described in Ross’s article. Ross counters this claim, pointing out that the 
lack of transparency in Chinese decision making makes identifying any process virtually 
impossible.12 A December 2011 piece by David Lundquest also suggests that nationalism is a key 
influence on Chinese foreign policy and strategy. This looks not only at the way in which Chinese 
policy makers take into account the public’s nationalist sentiment, but at the fact that the policy 
makers themselves have bought into these nationalistic beliefs about China’s place in the world.13 
This debate about the role of nationalism in both Chinese naval policy and general foreign policy is 
an important part of the literature. 
China in Perspective 
The other general argument that is raised in the literature is broadly opposed to the China threat 
perspective. This literature has a theoretical framework derived from both defensive realism and 
liberal institutionalism and usually challenges the China threat literature on the basis of factual 
accuracy, rather than on the offensive realist assumptions and view point. A clear example of this 
challenge to factual basis is a piece by Daniel Kostecka on ports that can be used for logistical 
support for PLAN ships on anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Kostecka’s discussion of the 
issue stands opposed to the ‘string of pearls’ thesis which states that China is seeking to build a 
series of port facilities, and eventually naval bases, across the Indian Ocean.14 By simply looking at 
the bases that have been proposed as part of the ‘string of pearls’, and the way that the PLAN has 
actually operated over the previous decades, Kostecka shows that the ‘string of pearls’ is non-
existent and infeasible.  Similarly, Erik Lin-Greenberg discusses the PLAN’s deployment of ships to 
                                                            
11
 Ibid.: 166. 
12
 Ibid.: 165 - 66, 72. 
13
 David Lundquist, "Nationalism, History & Policy," The Diplomat, 18 December 2011, accessed 11 January 2012,  
http://the-diplomat.com/china-power/2011/12/18/nationalism-history-foreign-policy/. 
14
 See Gurpreet S. Khurana, "China's ‘String of Pearls’ in the Indian Ocean and Its Security Implications," Strategic 
Analysis 32, no. 1 (2008). 
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participate in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia. Lin-Greenberg looks in detail at how 
the deployment might help develop the PLAN’s ability to conduct SLOC protection missions in the 
event of a major conflict, the Somalia mission being often cited as an example of China preparing 
for such a task. Lin-Greenberg states that the two mission types, SLOC protection and anti-piracy, 
are extremely different in the tasks that a navy would have to undertake to complete them 
successfully. Fending off pirates armed with rocket propelled grenades and Kalashnikovs is entirely 
different to defending shipping against the attacks of submarines, ships, and aircraft of another 
state. The author sees the only real training crossovers being in the area of sustaining a blue-water 
naval operation at a long range from the Chinese mainland, coordinating operations in a 
multinational environment, and equipment operation skills. He also cast doubt on the idea that 
the deployment is intended to protect Chinese citizens and economic interests, particularly as the 
initial period of the mission had PLAN ships only protecting Chinese flagged ships, rather than 
those with Chinese crews or even those heading to or from Chinese ports. What Lin-Greenberg 
suggests is that the Somali mission, as well as deployments of troops to UN peace keeping 
missions in Africa, demonstrates a new willingness in the Chinese government to deploy forces in 
military operations other than war. These forces act to enhance China’s image abroad as a 
responsible global actor.15  
Another example of the analysis of Chinese military capabilities is an article by Marshall Beier. 
Beier believes that the capabilities of the Chinese Navy are being grossly overestimated due to 
flawed analysis which is similar to what occurred with the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. 
Examining the Chinese fleet in detail, Beier questions the importance that is often given to the 
quantity of ships in the Chinese fleet, rather than the quality, which can be abysmal compared to 
more technologically advanced militaries. The prime example of this is Chinese submarines, the 
vast number of which are based on 1960s designs and would be of limited use in a conventional 
conflict. The ability of the Chinese shipbuilding industry is also bought into question as the most 
advanced Chinese surface combatants are Russian produced Sovremenny class destroyers, 
reflecting Chinese inability to produce its own modern and effective ships. The possible ongoing 
effects of the Cultural Revolution on the PLAN are also queried, with the author suggesting it may 
well have the kind of long term effects that Stalin’s purges had on the Soviet Military, creating a 
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 Erik Lin-Greenberg, "Dragon Boats: Assessing China's Anti-Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden," Defense & Security 
Analysis 26, no. 2 (2010): 217 - 18, 23, 26. 
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force that is far more political than professional. 16 As well as Beier’s main point about the actual 
capabilities of the PLAN, his article also suggests that the PLAN is in desperate need of 
modernisation if it is to become a force that can complete even basic military tasks, and in the 
case of China’s submarines, doing so without endangering the lives of the crew. But while Beier 
has a very thought-provoking thesis which has interesting implications for the study of the PLAN, it 
is important to note that, while many authors acknowledge that the PLAN has been underfunded 
for most of its existence, this article is unique in its assertion that both past and present ships of 
the Chinese fleet are of such a poor quality. Indeed some of the references in the article fail to 
back up the claims that Beier makes about Chinese warships. In particular, while Beier claims that 
the Russian Navy has retired many Sovremenny class destroyers from its fleet due to their 
obsolescence, this is not backed up by Beier’s references which only shown that the ships were 
retired, and not the reasons why. Beier’s work therefore is important, not for its analysis of the 
PLAN itself, but the implication that the Chinese Navy is being over estimated, and the need to 
have studies that are based on the quality of naval forces rather than on the number of ships in 
the fleet. 
In a broader examination of the drivers of China’s foreign policy strategy, Wang Jisi discusses some 
of the reasons why military competition between China and the USA is not in China’s interests, as 
well as examining how a more cooperative and open foreign policy would be beneficial for China. 
Wang examines some possible drivers of a grand strategy in Chinese foreign policy. One which is 
often suggested is focusing on the threat that the USA posses to China and attempting to build 
China into a global hegemon which can overcome this threat.17 This is a strategy which is in line 
with the predictions of offensive realists, particularly John Mearsheimer who argues that China’s 
ultimate goal is to achieve hegemony in Asia, displacing the US as the regions supreme military 
power.18  While the idea of opposing the US is popular with Chinese print media and websites 
covering security topics Wang dismisses this as an unrealistic option. This is due to the inevitable 
harm to China that would result from a strategy based on confrontation with its largest trading 
partner, and the damage it would do to China’s peaceful rise policies. Building China into a 
hegemon is also a far more ambitious and unrealistic goal than Chinese leaders are prepared to 
take on. Wang instead argues that Chinese leaders are shaping a foreign policy based on 
maintaining China’s core interests of sovereignty, security, and development. The best method of 
                                                            
16
 Marshall J. Beier, "Bear Facts and Dragon Boats: Rethinking the Modernization of Chinese Naval Power," 
Contemporary Security Policy 26, no. 2 (2005): 298 - 300, 02 - 03. 
17
 Wang Jisi, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way.," Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 
71. 
18
 John Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise," Current History 105, no. 690 (2006). 
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achieving this is maintaining a peaceful international environment. However, to achieve this China 
will need to recognise the legitimate concerns of it neighbours caused by the development of its 
naval forces and try to allay these through greater transparency and participation in institutions 
that enhance security in the Asia Pacific. Wang also dismisses the suggestion that the South China 
Sea is now one of China’s core interests, similar to Taiwan and Tibet, and that those 
commentators in China that made this claim were reckless and did so without official approval.19  
The Influence of Mahan 
The influence of the American naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan on the Chinese Navy is a subject 
that is currently hotly debated by those that study the PLAN. Mahan was an officer of the US Navy 
who served during the US Civil War, however it was as a naval theorist that he made his mark. 
Mahan’s first work was as a contributor to the history of the naval conduct of the US Civil War. 
This led to his appointment as a lecturer at the Naval War College in 1884.20  Mahan was the first 
historian to treat naval history as contributing factor in world events, rather than just listing the 
most important battles.21 Shaped by this reading of history through the lens of naval power, 
Mahan come to believe that strong naval power is essential in order for a state to maintain its 
strength, and that naval strength was a key determinant in the outcome of wars.22 Mahan was 
particularly interested in the implications for US security of the opening up of the Panama Canal 
and the strategically important waterway this would create in the Caribbean.23 Mahan’s studies of 
history lead to his thesis that: 
“a state with predominant sea power, including an adequate navy, a maritime-minded 
population sustained by a large merchant marine, well distributed bases, and control of 
narrow waterways could dominate world politics through the use of this power to 
blockade and strangle its rivals.”24 
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 Jisi, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way.," 71. 
20
 Encyclopedia of World Biography: Alfred Thayer Mahan, 2 ed., vol. 10 (Detroit: Gale, 2004). 
21
 Rolf Hobson, Imperialism at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan, 1875-
1914 (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002), 156. 
22
 Encyclopedia of World Biography: Alfred Thayer Mahan. 
23
 Hobson, Imperialism at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan, 1875-1914, 
166. 
24
 Greg Russell, "Alfred Thayer Mahan and American Geopolitics: The Conservatism and Realism of an Imperialist," 
Geopolitics 11, no. 1 (2006): 126. 
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Mahan’s work influenced US expansionists, such as Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 
who sought to push US influence outside its continental bounds.25 Even with this basic reading of 
Mahan, you can see how his work could be relevant to the current development of the PLAN.  
Liu Huaquing, the father of the modern Chinese Navy, is portrayed by some authors as being 
heavily influenced by Mahan, while others see Admiral Sergey Gorshkov as a foundational thinker 
for Liu’s own work in the PLAN. Gorshkov is said to have taught Liu while he studied at the 
Voroshilov Naval Academy in the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1958.26 In his article on the evolution 
of Chinese maritime doctrine, Ji You points to this influence on Liu’s strategic thinking and states 
that the PLAN followed similar steps under Liu that the Soviet Navy did under Goshkov.27 However, 
in a similar article by Nan Li, the influence of Gorshkov is questioned.  Nan points out that Liu’s 
memoir makes no mention of taking any courses with Gorshknov, as well as stating that he had 
great difficulties at the naval academy because he had no training in Russian. Furthermore, Liu’s 
memoir highlights the works of Mahan rather than Gorshkov.28 Bernard Cole points out the strong 
influence of Mahan on both Liu and Gorshkov, perhaps rendering the argument moot.29 
Currently the leading proponents of a Mahanian influence on the PLAN are James R. Holmes and 
Toshi Yoshihara. Holmes and Yoshihara put a caveat on the application of Mahan’s thinking by 
Chinese leadership. Rather than taking their strategy directly from Mahan, these scholars talk 
about Chinese leaders using Mahan’s logic in combination with Mao’s grammar.30 The use of the 
term grammar in this context is taken from the work of Carl von Clausewitz, and was used by the 
Prussian master to describe the differentiation between peacetime and wartime interaction 
between states. Holmes and Yoshihara’s conception of grammar in naval operations concerns fleet 
operations, thus negating the fact that Mahan was writing for a battleship navy, and so, 
operationally and tactically, his writings are outdated.31 So how is Mahan influencing the PLAN and 
Chinese naval thinkers? While Mahan is most often associated with world spanning sea power, 
such as that possessed by the USA, Chinese readers of Mahan are using it for more limited goals 
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which are still in line with Mahan’s strategies. Mahan stated that a strong navy is needed to 
defend a states merchant marine. The ability for the US Navy to cut off Chinese SLOC is a 
particular concern here and so following Mahan’s strategy the PLAN must be expanded so it can 
protect this merchant traffic. 32 The second Mahanian goal of the PLAN is to gain sea control, a 
limited goal that Holmes and Yoshihara draw from Mahan’s strategy proposed in 1890 that the US 
build a navy capable of guarding the approaches to the Panama Canal against all comers.33  In the 
context of the modern Chinese navy, this means keeping an enemy fleet from operating within 
what is termed the first island chain. Sea denial capability based on modernised surface, missile, 
air, and submarine forces, as well as efforts to deny the US air dominance, would help to achieve 
this.34 The Maoist grammar comes into sea denial through the use of the Chinese continent and 
the depth it offers to launch aircraft and missiles to harass an enemy fleet drawn close to the 
mainland.  Not only can offensive capabilities hide in this expanse, but strikes by an opposing state 
on the Chinese mainland to blunt these capabilities may present an unwanted escalation of a 
conflict for an enemy that has more limited goals. This would be combined with attacks by surface 
and subsurface combatants using exterior lines to hit the enemy from multiple directions.35 In this 
way Holmes and Yoshihara put forward a case for the influence of Mahan in the PLAN.  
Holmes and Yoshihara’s thesis is of course not without its critics, and these come into two broad 
categories. The first criticism is that the sources of Chinese military strategy are not known due to 
the lack of transparency within the Chinese government. In a critique of Holmes and Yoshihara 
work, Zheng Wang focuses on the sources that the two scholars use to come to their conclusions 
about Chinese naval strategy. Zheng states that many of the sources used are in fact popular 
commercial magazines written to satisfy demand from Chinese naval aficionados. Those writing 
articles for these magazines have no special access to inside information and they are written 
towards a nationalistic audience already supportive of the PLAN. This audience views naval power 
as a way to prevent a reoccurrence of past national humiliation. Zheng points out that there is a 
lack of transparency in Chinese military affairs that make assessing sources of Chinese strategy 
exceedingly difficult, but turning to non-government sources within China will not overcome it.36 
The second criticism asks to what extent Mahan’s strategy actually matters to Chinese policy. 
Michael McDevitt questions Holmes and Yoshihara for their tendency to see the influence of 
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Mahan in every work that Chinese authors produce about the PLAN. He makes the point that the 
current Chinese strategy could be arrived at without reference to the works of Mahan.37 This is 
perhaps the other extreme to Holmes and Yoshihara. It is certain that Mahan is having an 
influence on Chinese naval thinkers, and therefore Chinese naval strategy, but this could be simply 
through his role as the first historian to bring attention to the role of sea power in history rather 
than as a naval strategist. The question becomes a matter of degrees; are Mahan and Mao the 
only influences on Chinese naval thinking? Undoubtedly the answer is no. So while there is a role 
for the discussion of Mahan in almost all discussions of naval strategy, it is not necessary that he 
always take the lead. Bernard Cole talks about the influence of Mahan on Chinese strategy more in 
line with this view of contributing, but not dominant contributor. Cole includes Mahan in a list of 
other influential naval thinkers, including Wayne Hughes, Julian Corbett, Sergei Gorshkov, Colin 
Grey, and the PLAN’s own Liu Huaqing, all of whose works are widely studied in all navies including 
the Chinese.38  
Theoretical approaches 
There are three major theories of international relations that are the most often brought to bear 
on the maritime strategy of China and the operations of the PLAN. These are neo-liberalism, 
offensive realism, and defensive realism. Each of these theories makes quite distinct predictions 
about the shape of Chinese policy and what would be the optimal use of its resources. This section 
will first address why the theory of neo-liberalism, and particularly liberal institutionalism, is 
unhelpful for this study. It will then turn to the ongoing debate between offensive and defensive 
realism, and then the debate within defensive realism. This internal debate centres on issues 
including the importance of offence-defence balance, the role of balancing and bandwagoning, 
and the relative influence of economic and military power. This section will identify why defensive 
realism is the most useful theory for the case study of the PLAN and establish what defensive 
realism is.  
The first theory to be addressed here is neo-liberalism. This theory shares some of the same 
underlying assumptions as both offensive and defensive realism, particularly the centrality of 
states acting in their own self-interest. However, it also sees a greater role for cooperation 
between states.39 Cooperation is often conducted within international regimes or institutions 
within which states gain greater benefits for themselves than through individual action due to 
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reduced uncertainty.  Regimes and institutions decrease uncertainty by creating legal liability, 
reducing transaction costs, and enhancing transparency.  Due to the high cost of establishing 
regimes, states are reluctant to leave or start over, and even sub-optimal regimes are more 
beneficial to states than an unmitigated self-help environment.40 The particular problem with the 
use of this theory, in the case of China’s maritime strategy and the operations of the PLAN, is that 
China has specifically refused to engage in multilateral discussions on maritime territorial issues. 
Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi stated clearly during the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) in 2010 that China wished to conduct negotiations 
bilaterally, without the involvement of third parties (particularly the USA).41 Even when China has 
engaged in multilateral agreements, such as the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea’, which was signed between China and the ASEAN states in 2002, its subsequent 
actions in the region have contradicted the spirit of this agreement.42 In a recent article Gilbert 
Rozman paints a picture of an increasingly belligerent China that is only interested in 
multilateralism that advances its economic interests. Otherwise, China seeks bilateral negotiations 
that get the greatest leverage from its position as the regions dominant state.43 As China refuses 
to engage in multilateral institutions or negotiations on security matters, then neo-liberalism’s 
usefulness in this case is extremely limited.  
The next issue to address is the debate that is ongoing between defensive and offensive realist 
theory. These two theories share many assumptions on the nature of international relations but 
differ fundamentally on how these shape the outcomes of the international politics. The centrality 
of the state and its propensity to pursue its own self-interest are central to both theories, with this 
self interest particularly centred on the security of the state itself, the state always being 
concerned about its own survival. 44 For offensive realists, this concern with survival leads states to 
pursue power, primarily military power. The ultimate goal for a state in an offensive realist system 
is to be the preponderant military and economic power in its region, a hegemon, with the ability 
to block the emergence of a hegemon in any other region. John Mearsheimer, a leading offensive 
realist scholar, points to the USA as being a prime example of a hegemon. The USA is the 
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preeminent military and economic power in its region, and since World War II it has used its 
military power outside of its own region to prevent other powers from establishing hegemony in 
other regions, such as during the Cold War when US forces in Europe and Asia ensured another 
hegemon could not emerge in those regions.45 Defensive realism sees a role for power in 
international relation but it is a means of achieving that which defensive realists argue is the 
ultimate goal of states; security.46 Security is the primary goal of the state, as without it states 
cannot attain higher goals such as profit and development.47 In contrast to offensive realism, 
defensive realists envisage circumstances in which an increase in military power would result in a 
decrease in the security of the state, and thus a state acting to maximise its security may not seek 
an increase in military power. Therefore, a rising power may forgo an expansion of its military 
power if such an action would cause an arms race by other states and damage the security of the 
state as other states build up forces and ally to balance against it.48 
The basic divergence in the ultimate goal of the state gives the theories divergent views of the 
optimal strategies for states to undertake, as well as the likelihood of conflict in the international 
system. Offensive realists believe that states must always seek power and that this will eventually 
lead to conflict. They state that a rising power will always cause conflict between itself and an 
existing hegemon as both seek a preponderance of power. It is therefore in the hegemon’s 
interests to oppose the economic and military development of potential rivals, and to build 
coalitions within the challengers region in order to balance against the threat of the rising power. 
These strategies will ensure that the existing hegemon can retain its pre-eminence, but there is no 
way to prevent some form of conflict between a rising and an existing power.49 The outcomes 
predicted by defensive realism and the optimal strategies that it suggests are less clear cut. 
Defensive realism seeks to account for a greater number of variables than offensive realism, 
including offence-defence balance, security dilemma, domestically generated constraints on 
foreign policy, and leader’s perceptions of other states and their intentions.50 This at once makes 
defensive realism a more nuanced study of international affairs and also leads to criticism that the 
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scope of the theory makes it unfalsifiable and unuseful.51One of the key tenants of defensive 
realism is the intractability of the security dilemma, that is that the actions of one state to make 
itself more secure can result in another state feeling less secure and leading to the second state 
taking actions to remedy this through the development of its own strength.52 This system feeds on 
itself, and as militaries expand and mistrust grows between the states, so does the risk of 
miscalculation and war as one state may feel the need to strike first to defend against the 
perceived threat of its competing states. States, particularly strong states, are therefore best 
served by communicating restraint through their actions so that other states do not feel their 
security is threatened.53 Because states seek security rather than power, there is no end game that 
all states are working towards, as opposed to offensive realisms drive to hegemony.  
Both theories have come under criticism, particularly from authors of the competing theory. John 
A. Vasquez described the work of Kenneth Waltz and defensive realism as a degenerative research 
programme based on what he saw as a lack of evidence to support the theories conclusions.54 
Richard Rosecrance states that defensive theory is largely unfalsifiable and “unhelpful theoretically 
and empirically”. However, in what is a more telling statement, he also describes offensive realism 
as eminently falsifiable, but also demonstrably false.55 Others criticise offensive realist theory for 
its assertion that states will gain power, and therefore come closer to achieving hegemony 
through conflict. A study by Brandon Valeriano shows that only fourteen percent of great power 
conflicts actually end in victory for the great power. Disputes and conflict cannot therefore be 
exploited to gain power as readily as offensive realism claims.56 Another criticism of offensive 
realism is its overwhelming focus on power and great powers, usually the USA. This focus on 
power ignores areas that are clearly of great importance in a state’s foreign policy.57 Matthew 
Rendall also accuses Mearsheimer of selection bias in his seminal work on offensive realism, The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Rendall states that Mearsheimer’s work focuses on aggressive 
states during historically aggressive periods, and ignores states that had the potential to become 
militarily great powers but forgo the option. This leads to conclusions that overstate the frequency 
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of high risk, high cost aggression by states in pursuit of hegemony.58 While offensive realism is 
satisfied with its explanation of the competition for power, several defensive realist authors have 
sought to address the criticisms levelled at their area of study, seeking to clarify their position. This 
work allows for an examination of Chinese maritime policy that can explain both the growth and 
restraint in Chinese maritime forces, and which has the possibility of outcomes other than the 
conflict offered by offensive realism. The need for theoretical explanations other than offensive 
realism is further heightened by the role of nuclear weapons, which have made the risks 
associated of great power wars hopelessly high. The next section of this chapter will look at 
defensive realism and its current debates so that the expectations of the theory are made clear. 
Defensive realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz, and looks at the international system 
itself as the predominant influence on state behaviour. This focus on structure was a counter 
argument to the classical realism of authors such as Hans Morgenthau that explained state 
behaviour as an extension of a human desire to dominate others through violence, a desire that 
states fulfil through war.59 Instead, defensive realism finds the motivation of states in the 
structure of the international system, rather in any inherent human motivation. The international 
system is one of anarchy, in which there is no higher power than the state. States do not have 
another body to guarantee their safety and so they must ensure their own security.60 Defensive 
realism still holds that states are self interested, however states will only seek to expand in certain 
conditions. States that do not meet these conditions may still try to undertake expansion, 
however this is often due the leader of a state believing that aggression is the only method to 
make their state secure.61 In a situation in which a country cannot guarantee its own security it 
may cooperate with other states in order to achieve this.62 The likelihood of this occurring, and 
who a state allies with, is a significant debate within defensive realism itself.  
In his original theory of defensive realism, Waltz stated that a state has two options when its 
security is threatened by another state: it will either balance or bandwagon. Within Waltz’s 
conception, to balance was to join a weaker coalition to oppose a stronger power.63 The other 
option a state has is to bandwagon with the aggressive state, to join with them in order that the 
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state will avoid the harsher treatment which would be meted out against an opposing state. Such 
bandwagoning is at the cost of the weaker state, having to give up autonomy, and accepting 
domination.64 States then have two options when faced with an aggressive state; to be with them 
or against them. This perspective on balancing and bandwagoning has been questioned by authors 
subsequently. An article by Randall L. Schweller questions Waltz’s vision of bandwagoning, arguing 
that Waltz puts the bandwagoning at the opposite end of the spectrum from balancing, being an 
option in similar to capitulation in that states essentially surrender to an aggressor. Schweller 
states that there can be both positive and negative inducements to undertake bandwagoning 
behaviour, including sharing the spoils of victory and economic inducements. He also argues that 
balancing is almost always a more costly behaviour than bandwagoning. This leads Schweller to 
the conclusion that the instances of balancing in the international system have likely been over 
stated by authors such as Walt and Waltz, and that states will bandwagon for profit or where their 
interests ally with the aggressor state.65 Schweller’s work on balancing and bandwagoning adds 
more options to the analysis of this behaviour, removing the simple fight or fall dichotomy that 
had existed in the literature. However, the propensity of states to bandwagon based on economic 
inducements has also been challenged by authors.   
Robert S. Ross produced an article which sought to challenge the assertion that secondary states 
will bandwagon with great powers that have a preponderance of economic force, rather than 
military force. This plays into the work of Schweller, examining what conditions are likely to 
generate balancing or bandwagoning behaviour in states. It was Robert L. Rothstein who posited 
that secondary states, those that are on the tier below great powers, will align themselves based 
on their individual circumstances and local balance.66 This can include a function for the economic 
influence of great powers, as well as military capabilities.67 Ross tests this theory using the case 
study of Asia and the reaction of regional secondary powers to the rise of Chinese economic and 
military powers. Ross finds that perceptions and responses to Chinese power by secondary states 
are moderated by geographical proximity.  States that are close enough to China to be threatened 
by China’s developing military power (Vietnam, Burma, South Korea, and also Taiwan) will 
accommodate China’s interests and will not act to balance against China. Those further from China 
and less threatened by its military development are more likely to balance against China’s growing 
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capabilities. Ross uses the example of Japan and Singapore, states that are both balancing against 
China and increasing cooperation with the US, despite having respectively negative and positive 
views of China’s intentions in the region. The influence of economics on the actions of secondary 
states is therefore minimal compared to the combination of military strength and proximity of a 
great power.68 Ross’ article also confirms one of Schweller’s basic conclusions from his work on 
balancing and bandwagoning, that balancing is less common than is asserted by some defensive 
realist scholars.69 Ross’ article was published in 2006 during a period in which China’s military 
policy and diplomatic efforts in the region where less bellicose than they are now and may no 
longer reflect the situation in Asia. As will be shown later in this paper, the position of some states, 
particularly Vietnam, the Philippines, and Burma, have now changed and active balancing against 
Chinese capabilities can now be seen. The most important lesson from Ross’ article is that the 
attractiveness of China’s economic success counts for less with states than its growth in military 
power.  
Offence-defence balance is another area important to defensive realism that has been subject to 
significant debate. Offence-defence balance, originally set out by Robert Jervis, seeks to measure 
whether military technology favours a state on the offence or defence. In an era in which offensive 
technology has the advantage, then it is easier for states to take territory than defend what they 
have. This creates an incentive for states to attack threatening neighbours in order to guarantee 
their own security. Conversely, when defensive technology predominates, then states can easily 
hold what they own and it is very costly to take territory, therefore war is unlikely.70 However, 
there is a major issue with offence-defence balance and its ability to be usefully applied to this 
research topic, being that it focuses predominantly on land combat. An article by Steven Biddle 
states the naval conflicts are beyond the scope of the theory, but argues that the vast majority of 
conflicts are continental (land based) and therefore this is not a major issue for the theory.71 For 
this research topic it clearly is an issue. However, there are some aspects of offence-defence 
balance that can be applied to a naval conflict, primarily that distance favours defence. The 
greater the distance an attacker is from the defender the greater the advantage for the defender, 
as the costs and difficulty of logistics increases.72 In other respects, combat at sea does not have a 
defensive element in that both sides are trying to destroy the opposing force on essentially neutral 
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terrain, making both sides essentially offensive. The compact geographic nature of the contested 
space in Asia, particularly those areas with territorial disputes, further limits any differences based 
on distance. Even the US has bases in the region that serve to limit the effects of distance on US 
forces. Therefore, with this papers focus on naval strategy and forces, the offence-defence 
balance is not a useful concept at present. In the future, and with the increasing importance of 
maritime Asia in both defence planning and international relations research, maritime aspects will 
need to be integrated into this concept to keep it relevant.  
The last facet of defensive realism that is important to understand is the security dilemma and 
how this effects the actions of states. The security dilemma is one of the cornerstones of defensive 
realism, thought the concept is also utilised in different ways by offensive realists and neoliberal 
scholars.73 While a basic overview of security dilemma was given earlier in this chapter, the 
concept will be developed in detail in this section, examining the key components of the concept. 
The term ‘security dilemma’ was coined by John Herz, and was used to describe how within the 
anarchic international system states would take steps to protect themselves from the threat 
posed by another state by acquiring additional military capacity, capacity which would then cause 
other states to feel threatened. In this cycle, even states that sought peace would be dragged into 
a cyclic struggle for power which threatened arms races and war.74 From the analysis of security 
dilemma definitions, Shiping Tang identifies eight key aspects of security dilemma: its source is the 
anarchic nature of the international system; this anarchy creates uncertainty about intentions, 
creating fear between states; it is unintentional; as a defence against uncertain intentions, states 
accumulate  power to protect themselves, which will invariably contain some offensive capability; 
the security dilemma is self-reinforcing and can lead to spirals of deteriorating relationships; 
accumulating such power can be self-defeating, with additional power resulting in less security; it 
can result in a vicious cycle causing unnecessary wars; it can be reduced by both material and 
psychological factors.75 Material factors which influence security dilemma include geographic 
proximity, the regional military balance, offence-defence balance, and the level of difficulty in 
extracting resources from captured territory.76 Historical mistrust between states, misperceptions, 
and ethnocentrism are examples of psychological factors.77 The causes and consequences of the 
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security dilemma are an important part of defensive realism and vital for understanding the 
theory.  
This paper intends to further develop the use of defensive realism as the key theoretical 
perspective to examine the operations of the Chinese Navy, as well as China’s maritime strategy. 
Understanding the key concepts of defensive realism will allow this paper to both test Chinese 
actions against the theoretical expectations, as well as identifying short falls is the literature. As 
can already be seen in the discussion of the offence-defence balance, there are some areas of the 
theory that are as yet not readily applicable to this topic. Defensive realism is nonetheless a robust, 
well debated and developed theory of the interactions between states. However, it has yet to be 
appled to the case of Chinese maritime strategy, and this is the area in which this research paper 
will contribute most to the existing literature. Throughout this paper it will be shown that Chinese 
maritime strategy is in line with a state that has, as its highest goal, its own security rather than 
the power, as argued by offensive realists. It will also show how there is a developing arms race in 
Asia as a result of both China’s quest for security and a security dilemma which has spread from it. 
In the end it is my hope that the evidence presented in this paper both proves the tenets of 
defensive realism, and by doing so help to disprove one of the central arguments put forward by 
offensive realists: that China has, at the centre of its maritime strategy, the goal of becoming the 
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A HISTORY OF THE PLAN 
The PLAN lacks the centuries of operational experience present in most navies around the world. 
Created in 1949, and formally established in 1950 during the final phase of the Chinese Civil War, 
the PLAN has, for almost its entire history been a secondary priority to the PLA, with ground forces 
coming first. The role of the PLAN has changed greatly since its creation 60 years ago, and its 
strategy has evolved to fit the major threats to the security of the Chinese state. An understanding 
of the evolution of the PLAN, including its perceived importance in the defence of China, the level 
of funding it has received, and the strategy it has undertaken, are vital to understanding the 
current path of the navy of the People’s Republic. This history shows that the PLAN has 
undertaken a development pragmatically based on the security needs of the People’s Republic. 
China’s Maritime Heritage 
China is not without a maritime tradition, with the voyages of Zheng He being the favoured 
example of China’s previous maritime supremacy. The voyages of his treasure fleets marked the 
end of a five hundred year period, spanning from the 10th to 15th centuries, in which the Middle 
Kingdom’s navy was both quantitatively and qualitatively superior to any other on earth.78 During 
his Voyages, Zheng He visited as far away as modern day Yemen and Somalia, as well as a great 
many areas in Asia.79 Following these voyages, the Empire’s enthusiasm for the navy and maritime 
trade was to end. This was due to the high cost of conducting the voyages, the growing 
continental threat to the ruling dynasty, Confucian opposition to foreign contact, as well as a 
backlash against the power of eunuchs like Zheng in the Imperial Court.80  The navy was relegated 
to the position of a coast guard and its main role was keeping piracy under control along China’s 
coasts and rivers.81 For 400 years this limited role for the navy was all that was required as the 
main threats to dynasties come from the continent rather than the sea.82 This stagnation in the 
operations of the navy and its technological development would have a devastating effect on 
China with the arrival of modern European navies in the 19th century.  
The Chinese navy was subjected to the full force of modern European military technology during 
the First Opium War, and was revealed to be entirely obsolete. The war began in 1840 between 
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China and the United Kingdom over the right of British traders to sell opium in China, as well as 
other grievances, and would eventually involve France and the USA as well.83 Following the 
crushing defeats of the Opium Wars, efforts were made to modernise the navy by emulating 
European technologies, but it never gained the support and funding needed to build a force 
capable of fending off the large and sophisticated naval forces of the Western Powers.84 The 
Imperial Navy suffered heavy defeats at the hands of the French in 1884, and the Japanese in 1894 
and 1895.85 During the Republican period, which lasted from 1912 to the outbreak of the Civil War 
in 1945, the navy was again a low priority for a state divided amongst warlords and occupied by 
foreign powers backed by their own powerful navies. What warships the Republic did possess 
were either those left from the Dynastic period or purchased from overseas.86 The maritime 
heritage of pre-communist China shows that, while it had been a great naval power, legitimate 
and pressing continental threats had been greater than those from the sea for much of its history 
and made the navy a low priority. Only with the arrival of European powers to the region did China 
face a sea-born threat to its security, and by then 400 years of neglect left it in no position to 
compete with modern navies in combat or defend its shores.  
Civil War Origins and the First Decade  
The PLAN had its origins during the final years of the Chinese Civil War. In 1949, Chinese 
nationalist forces, properly referred to as the Kuomintang (KMT), began withdrawing from the 
mainland onto several islands, including Taiwan, Jinmen, Hainan, and Zhoushan.87 The Communist 
forces required naval equipment with which it could conduct amphibious landings in order to 
retake these islands. One of the first of these landings was undertaken on 24 October 1949, on 
Jinmen Island, with PLA forces using 200 fishing junks to land a first wave of 10,000 troops. The 
landing was a disaster, with KMT forces destroying the transports in the first wave, preventing any 
reinforcement being sent to support the initial landing. After three days of fighting the PLA forces 
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were defeated with a loss of 9,000 men, including 3,000 taken captive.88 Following the defeat, all 
amphibious operations were halted and the PLA high command had the Twelfth Army Group, 
Fourth Field Army’s headquarters reorganised, creating the headquarters of the PLAN. The Twelfth 
Army Group’s commander, Senior General Xiao Jinguang, became the PLAN’s first commander. 
Xiao had been a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1920 and was both a 
veteran of the Long March and a distinguished field officer. He was selected for his political 
reliability and combat record, not for any maritime experience. This would be the pattern in the 
selection of the PLAN commander until 1988.89 
The PLAN was not completely bereft of warships at its founding. In April of 1949, 25 KMT warships 
had defected to the PLA, and sixteen additional escorts and gunboats were rapidly repaired so that 
they could be added to the order of battle. Expanding the navy was a top priority for Mao Zedong 
and the communist leadership, as it would be required to finally defeat the KMT by assaulting the 
islands they held. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance was signed 
in February 1950, and provided for $300 million in loans for the new Chinese government.  Mao 
used half of this money to place orders for ships and equipment for the navy.90 In 1959 the Soviet 
Union provided the PRC with the licences to produce ballistic-missile submarines, medium attack 
submarines, two variants of missile boat, torpedo boats, and submarine and surface launched 
anti-ship missiles. These would be the designs that the PLAN would base the majority of its fleet 
on for the remainder of the century.91  This initial focus on the PLAN did not last past the outbreak 
of the Korean War, and a resulting shift in China’s military priorities to ground combat. The 
positioning of the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait during the war also made any further 
action against the KMT forces on Taiwan impossible, though a few smaller islands were retaken. At 
the conclusion of the Korean War, the leadership of the PLA saw maritime forces as having played 
only a minor role in the conflict, which served to reinforce their view of the primacy of land forces 
and that the navy should be limited to a coastal defence role. The result was the PLAN being given 
a lower funding priority for the decade following the Korean War.92  
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During its first decades, the strategy of the PLAN, as much as it can be said to have one, was an 
adaptation of the Young School, an approach developed by the Soviet Union during its own Civil 
War and so well suited to the PRC at that point in time.93 This approach was combined with Mao’s 
concept of a people’s war to create operation guidance under which the PLAN operated. Devised 
by the now Admiral Xiao Jinguang, the guidance envisioned the PLAN as a light force operating in 
support of ground forces.94 The main responsibility of the PLAN was the defence of the Chinese 
coastline 12 nautical miles out to sea and 300 km inland in the face of raids by the KMT. This was 
mostly achieved by land forces rather than warships.95 The other task was protecting fishing ships 
and maritime commerce from attacks by the KMT’s naval forces, and this was only achieved in the 
late 1960s. An effort to develop a more comprehensive Chinese strategy for maritime defence, 
based on Soviet models, began in 1954 at the Nanjing Military Academy, but came to a halt with a 
political campaign against ‘dogmatism’ in 1959, and would not restart until Mao’s death in 1976.96 
The breakdown of the Sino-Soviet relationship in late 1960s resulted in a further marginalisation of 
the PLAN as the focus shifted from the south and east coast, which were threatened by the KMT, 
to the northern land border and the threat of the Soviet Union.97  
People’s War 
In order to understand the subordinate role that the navy played in the thinking of China’s 
leadership, the military strategy of the PLA, people’s war, needs to be explained. People’s war 
doctrine was developed by Mao Zedong and was based on his experience in the struggle against 
the Japanese during WWII, a period in which the KMT controlled frontline operations and so only 
guerrilla activities were open to communist forces.98 The doctrine was intended as a method of 
defending China against the superior nuclear and conventional forces of either the Soviet Union or 
the USA. One of the fundamental aspects of people’s war is that politics and men are more 
important than sophisticated weapons. The Chinese people, fully indoctrinated and mobilised, was 
said to constitute a weapon far more potent than nuclear weapons.99 This stood in opposition to 
the nuclear, naval and air power of the USA, USSR, and UK. These states were described as ‘paper 
tigers’, not necessarily because they lacked power, but because the march of history dictated that 
                                                            
93
 Ibid., 163. 
94
 You, "The Evolution of China's Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models : 1949-2001," 5. 
95
 Li, "The Evolution of China's Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From “near Coast” and “near Seas” to “Far Seas”," 146. 
96
 You, "The Evolution of China's Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models : 1949-2001," 4-5. 
97
 Cole, "The People's Liberation Army Navy after Half a Century: Lessons Learned in Beijing," 173. 
98
 Harlan W. Jencks, ""People's War under Modern Conditions": Wishful Thinking, National Suicide, or Effective 
Deterrent?," The China Quarterly, no. 98 (1984): 311. 
99
 Ralph L. Powell, "Maoist Military Doctrines," Asian Survey 8, no. 4 (1968): 241-42. 
DEFENSIVE REALISM AND CHINESE MARITIME STRATEGY  
27 
 
imperialism and capitalism will inevitably fall. Due to this inherent internal weakness, these 
regimes were forced to place all their faith in sophisticated weapons, but these would not prevent 
their demise.100  Practically speaking, people’s war relied in defence in depth, based on the use of 
China’s vast geographic area and population, as well as the dispersal of industry, to force any 
invader to fight a protracted war against numerous Chinese guerrillas in its rear, while also facing 
conventional Chinese units at the front.101 As can readily be seen, there is no role for the navy in 
such a war, and the development of the fleet actually stood opposed to people’s war in many 
respect. To invest in advanced technology was to put faith in the same ‘paper tigers’ which Mao 
and other Chinese leaders so derided the west for. As the status of Mao continued to rise, 
particularly during the Cultural Revolution, it became more and more difficult to question the 
doctrine of people’s war and the subordinate status it gave the PLAN.  
The Cultural Revolution 
Between 1967 and 1969, the PLAN became embroiled in the Cultural Revolution that had been 
sweeping the country since 1966. During this period, over 80,000 officers were accused of political 
disloyalty and other crimes, and were purged from the service. 1,169 of these officers would later 
be executed or die due to torture or starvation. Research programmes and military academies 
were shut down and regular training ground to a halt. Marshall Lin Biao, head of the PLA and vice 
chairman of the CCP during the Cultural Revolution, stacked the leadership of the PLA with his 
supporters, who in turn selected leaders based on their political loyalty, further crippling the 
PLAN.102 The relationship between Lin and Mao deteriorated in 1970, and resulted in Lin’s death in 
a plane crash in 1971 as he fled China. Following his death there were further reforms of the PLA 
as generals and programmes associated with Lin were removed and cancelled. The Lin affair also 
resulted in a “precipitous decline in the military budget” from 1971.103 The Cultural Revolution can 
be characterised as a lost ten years in China’s development, but analysing global naval 
development during the period, Bernard Cole puts the damage to PLAN modernisation at two 
decades. 104 Any technological development within the fleet progressed slowly and at a high cost, 
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and this, along with the effects of purges and politicisation, would have a lasting effect on the 
PLAN.105  
The Rise of Deng Xiaoping and the Navy 
The 1970s saw the start of a series of processes which would lead to an expansion of the role of 
the PLAN in the 1980s. The PLAN had its first blue water task when it was required to monitor 
tests of the Dong-Feng 5 (DF-5) ballistic missile in 1972, and this lead Admiral Xiao to push for a 
blue water fleet. The need for this fleet was further demonstrated when the PLAN were required 
to conduct operations in the Parcel Islands against the South Vietnamese Navy in 1974.106 By 1975 
Mao had declared the PLAN as being inadequate for current and future needs, and in July of that 
year he approved a plan by Admiral Xiao to modernise the PLAN.107 The death of Mao and the 
ascent of Deng Xiaoping was another momentous event in the PLAN’s history. Under Deng, 
‘people’s war’ became ‘people’s war under modern conditions’, and military modernisation 
became a stated goal of China’s leadership.108 The 1970s also saw the navy adopt new tactics as it 
focused its attention on the threat of Soviet invasion through the Bohai Sea and landing 
amphibious forces near Beijing.109  Due to the superiority of the enemy, Chinese forces would 
conceal themselves along the coast as the enemy fleet approached, and then attack from multiple 
directions as landing forces transferred ships and prepared for the drive to shore. Attacking at 
these times would cause maximum casualties and disruption, but the tactics were still mostly 
delaying actions relying on the army to achieve final victory.110  
In 1979, Deng approved an extension of the navy’s area of responsibility from the near-coast to 
the near-sea.111 The shift was driven by Admiral Liu Huaqing, a man now considered the father of 
the modern PLAN.112 Like Xiao, Liu was a veteran of the Long March, but Liu had undergone naval 
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training in the USSR from 1954 to 1958. He would go on to draft the strategy of near-seas active 
defence which would be adopted in 1987. This new area of responsibility would be patrolled by 
the new surface combatants and submarines that had come into service with the fleet during the 
1970s. The Han-class (Type 091) nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) had been built as part of 
a push to build nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). New Luda-class (Type 051) 
guided-missile destroyers (DDG) and Jianghu-class (Type 053) guided-missile frigates (DDG) also 
entered into service, giving the PLAN a higher number of large surface combatants than it had ever 
possessed before. Like the SSNs, these ships were not developed specifically for the new mission, 
rather to support ballistic missile testing in the Pacific Ocean, but were too large to slot into the 
existing in-shore defence strategy.113 The extension of the PLAN’s area of responsibility, which 
would in the next decade carry through to a new maritime strategy for the PLAN, is therefore 
likely due to both a change in leadership in the PRC and a change in composition of the PLAN fleet.  
1980s: More Responsibility, Less Funding 
The 1980s saw a reassessment of the threat environment that the PRC faced, particularly on the 
maritime front. With the improvement of the relationship between China and the USA, the 
Chinese leadership could now rely on the protection of the American fleet to defend the Chinese 
coast from a Soviet attack.114 Two other events also contributed to a decline in the funding 
received by the PLAN and the PLA generally. The 1979 war between Vietnam and China had a very 
limited role for the PLAN, confined to the surveillance of Soviet forces deployed in the region, with 
no combat between the Vietnamese and Chinese Navies.115 The war showed up significant 
deficiencies in PLA ground forces and rectifying these was a priority that resulted in funds being 
diverted from the PLAN.116 Deng’s programme of modernising the Chinese economy, which began 
in 1985, also resulted in a dramatic decline in military spending. This would particularly affect the 
navy, as projects like warships are capital intensive and were difficult to justify in the face of other 
defence needs. This decline in defence spending contrasted with a dramatic increase in the 
responsibilities of the PLAN. These were brought about by a new strategy devised by Admiral Liu in 
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the early 1980s and accepted as China’s maritime policy in 1987. This strategy was summarised as 
“defend actively, operate in the near seas”.117 The near seas were defined as, 
“1) the first island-chain, which stretches from the Kurile islands through the islands of 
Japan, Ryukyu Archipelago, Taiwan, the Philippines to Borneo Island; 2) the Yellow Sea, 
East China Sea and South China Sea, or the three near seas within the inner rims of the first 
island-chain, and 3) sea areas adjacent to the outer rims of this island-chain, and those of 
the north Pacific.”118 
The PLAN’s new strategy broke the navy from its previous supporting role to ground forces and 
gave it independent tasks, including the restoration of lost or disputed maritime territories 
(including Taiwan), protecting maritime resources, and securing major SLOC in the event of war, as 
well as conventional defence and deterrence, and nuclear deterrence.119 This new strategy was in 
line with the new overall military strategy of the PRC approved by the Central Military Commission 
in 1985. The new strategy shifted the PLA’s focus from preparing for a nuclear war with the USSR 
to preparing for local and limited wars on China’s periphery.120  
The continuing constraints on the PLAN’s budget could be seen in the acquisition of new classes of 
ship. While Jianghu and Luda class ships continued to be produced, newer surface combatants 
were not, due to limited funding, and because any warships that China were to build would be 
based on obsolete technology in terms of propulsion, information technology, and other key areas. 
This obsolescence was so great as to compromise a ships ability to operate in the newly expanded 
operational area.121 The only significant additions to the fleet in this period were two new classes 
of submarines.  The Ming-class (Type 035) submarine (SS) entered service, though this class 
represented only an update of the Romeo class of SS, the design of which China purchased from 
the USSR in 1959. The other was the Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) 
which finally became operational after decades of research and six years of fit out and testing. 
However the Xia would never complete a deterrence cruise, and even if it did, three of the class 
would be required for an effective continuous nuclear deterrent.122  
                                                            
117
 Li, "The Evolution of China's Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From “near Coast” and “near Seas” to “Far Seas”," 150, 
56. 
118




 Cole, "The People's Liberation Army Navy after Half a Century: Lessons Learned in Beijing," 176. 
121
 Li, "The Evolution of China's Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From “near Coast” and “near Seas” to “Far Seas”," 
156-57. 
122
 Ibid.: 152. 
DEFENSIVE REALISM AND CHINESE MARITIME STRATEGY  
31 
 
1985 saw the fleet complete its first foreign port call, a visit by a Luda-class destroyer and a 
replenishment ship to Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. The visit was initiated on orders of the 
Chinese leadership who wished to use the PLAN to further the PRC’s diplomatic interests with 
these states. The task force appears to have had some difficulties with underway replenishment in 
inclement sea conditions, and the ability to resupply ordnance to the warship at sea was also 
limited.123 These tasks were vital to the PLAN’s ability to operate within the near seas. An 
additional trip by the training ship Zhenghe was made to Hawaii in 1989. By the 1990s, port visits 
by the PLAN became a regular occurrence in Asia, and then further afield.124 But the PLAN was still 
limited in the operations that it could conduct far from the Chinese mainland. Violence in Somalia 
in 1991 lead to a request for the evacuation of personnel from the Chinese embassy, however the 
PLAN had no assets that could conduct that type of operation at such a great distance from the 
mainland. Civilian cargo ships had to be diverted in order to evacuate the staff, with local tugboats 
transferring people from shore to ship.125 While this was an embarrassment to the PLAN, it did not 
result in any significant boost to the funding or the priority of the navy, this would come in the 
mid-1990s following the Taiwan Strait Crisis.  
The Taiwan Strait Crisis 
The origins of the crisis itself lie in Chinese perceptions that the US policy towards Taiwan was 
shifting towards a more pro-independence position than it had previously taken, one that was at 
odds with private assurances made by Washington to Beijing. 126 The Chinese leadership also 
wished to influence the elections that were taking place on the island at the end of 1995 and 
beginning of 1996, hoping to dissuade residents of Taiwan from voting for pro-independence 
parties and candidates. In response to these events in both the US and Taiwan, the PLA conducted 
a series of exercises centred on the Nanjing military district across the Strait from Taiwan.127 Held 
between July 1995 and March 1996, these exercises included amphibious landings, bombing by 
the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and live naval fire by the PLAN off the coast of Fujian.128 The most 
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provocative actions were the test firing of a total of ten DF-15 short-range ballistic missiles, some 
landing as close as 20 miles from major Taiwanese ports.129  Reacting to these provocations, and 
mindful of the need to reassure other Asian allies that it took its security promises seriously, the 
US deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region in March of 1996. The USS 
Independence and its group sailed from Okinawa and took up station in the seas east of Taiwan. 
The USS Nimitz and its group redeployed from the Persian Gulf to the Philippine Sea so that it 
could respond quickly to any changes in the situation.130 The deployment of the two carriers and 
their associated forces represented the largest deployment of US forces in the region since the 
end of the Vietnam War and was a clear demonstration of US commitment to its allies.131 The 
crisis wound down as the US forces quietly observed the PLA exercises as they concluded, and 
Taiwan conducted the second of its elections and took no further steps towards independence. In 
the end, both the PRC and USA achieved their goals, the US having demonstrated its commitment 
to the region, and the PRC showing the importance it placed on the issue of Taiwanese 
independence and causing a change of US policy in which a more cautious approach was taken to 
relations with Taiwan.132 But for the PLAN, the crisis would bring in a new factor to its planning, 
the US Navy.  
The Taiwan Strait Crisis is the line that this paper will use as the start point for the current 
modernisation programme of the PLAN. It represented a new focus by the PLAN on the 
involvement of the USA in any armed conflict.133 The crisis would trigger a funding increase for the 
PLAN and lead to the purchase of new, Russian made vessels. The Chinese “proceeded to develop 
forces centred on air, naval, and missile platforms to foreclose future American interventions.”134 
Countering a US intervention was now seen as vital if China was maintain its security and 
territorial integrity by ensuring Taiwan could not unilaterally declare independence. While 
elements of China’s modernisation efforts predate this period, these efforts were likely reinforced 
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and accelerated by the crisis.135 So it is from this point that the exploration of Chinese naval 
modernisation will begin.  
The history of the PLAN shows its development from a force that existed purely to support the 
army to an independent, strategic force. The major driver of change in China’s maritime strategy 
was changes in the greatest perceived threat to the county’s territory. Other shifts were a result of 
finding places for ships not constructed of military necessity.  The threats to China’s territory 
shaped its military forces in a way that defensive realists would expect. Chinese efforts were 
focused on develop a force to suit its security threats. Military power was shaped towards defence, 
rather than a force that could expand Chinese territory or influence. The navy’s limited utility in 
the defence of China sidelined it for most of the PRCs history, and only the recognition of the 
threat that US naval forces posed against Chinese territory and territorial integrity changed this. 
Another striking aspect of the history of the PLAN is its failure to develop into a modern force over 
the first 50 years of its existence. The Cultural Revolution certainly had a role to play in this, as did 
the commitment to people’s war which only abetted after the death of Mao. It left the PLAN with 
a fleet based on 1950s Soviet designs and bleeding edge technology which resulted in a single and 
almost entirely useless SSBN. These are the conditions which the PLAN now seeks to overcome to 










                                                            
135
 Ronald O'Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for 
Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 2-3. 
34 
 
MODERNISATION OF THE FLEET 
Motivations 
While this paper will begin the discussion of the modernisation efforts of the PLAN from the 1996 
Taiwan Straits Crisis, this was not the sole factor that led to a greater focus on the need for a 
modernised navy. Territorial integrity, economic and energy concerns, and the implications on 
Chinese security of the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo intervention also played into the 
development of the PLAN and strategy during this period. An additional motivation that would be 
posited by offensive realists is that China is seeking to push the US out of Asia in order to establish 
hegemony in the region, and therefore the modernising of the navy is part of this drive. Defensive 
realists instead focus on the search for security, which this paper will argue is more important. We 
will now look at these factors and how they change Beijing’s view of the utility of a modern navy.  
The first issue which will be addressed here is Taiwan and the concerns associated with it. The 
Taiwan Strait Crisis showed the Chinese leadership, in extremely stark terms, how seriously the 
USA took the issue of Taiwanese self determination. The deployment of two aircraft carriers and 
their battle groups to the region was an unexpected and startling action to Beijing. While the US 
had long standing commitments to Taiwan’s defence, Chinese authorities had not bargained on 
the US being prepared to use force to defend it, and had it not been for the Chinese missile tests 
the US may not have.136 The PLA now had to devise strategies that could prevent US interference 
in any future conflict to prevent Taiwanese independence, thereby maintaining Chinese territorial 
integrity and security. As any US intervention would have to come by sea, it was natural that the 
PLAN would be the main beneficiary of a resulting increase in spending. Military forces would also 
need to be able to effectively deter any further moves towards independence by Taiwanese 
authorities. The military advantage that Taiwan maintained over the mainland had allowed 
Taiwanese leaders to make the bold movements in the direction of independence that was one of 
the major causes of the 1995-96 crisis.137 By reversing that military advantage China could 
influence political rhetoric in Taiwan away from independence and towards an outcome that was 
more on the mainland’s terms. The development of the Chinese Navy following the Taiwan Straits 
crisis was therefore a move to influence the political rhetoric on Taiwan away from independence, 
and have a capability to forestall US involvement in the event of conflict between China and the 
rebel province.  
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The difficulty of countering the capabilities of the US military had been demonstrated by the 
failure of the militaries of Serbia and Iraq to present any meaningful resistance to US actions in the 
Kosovo intervention and the Persian Gulf War. These conflicts demonstrated the long range 
precision strike capabilities that the US military could bring to bear in a conflict.138 Both conflicts 
saw the extensive use of US maritime power, including the use of aircraft carriers and the 
extensive use of Tomahawk cruise missiles. With a range of 900 nm (nautical miles) or 1,700 km 
the Tomahawk cruise missile allowed the US to strake land targets from far off shore.139 If the PLA 
was to counter the threat to the security of the state that such weapons presented, then the 
maritime zone of control that the PLAN was capable of establishing had to be extended. However, 
it was not just the capabilities demonstrated in these conflicts that troubled Beijing. The Kosovo 
intervention was justified without the authorisation from the United Nations, instead universal 
human rights were invoked as a sufficient justification for the intervention. China saw this as a 
precedent that could also be applied to Taiwan and even Tibet. It was felt that the PLA had to be 
prepared to defend China from the threat to its sovereignty that such an intervention would 
present.140 
Economic and energy concerns are also one of the major contributors to the drive for naval 
modernisation in the period following the Taiwan Strait Crisis. The economy of China has grown at 
a staggering rate over the past two decades and this is important in terms of motivating and 
paying for the modernisation of the PLAN. Economic growth plays into the need for a more 
effective navy in four ways. The first is due to the fact that China’s economic growth has centred 
itself along the coast, and this leaves it vulnerable to attack from the sea, attacks which the US 
military has proven a devastating ability to deliver.141 Secondly, with the growth of the Chinese 
economy, China now relies on maritime trade to fuel its economy. Over 90 percent of China’s 
trade is transported by sea, and a majority of this maritime trade, including 80% of China’s oil 
needs, has to transit the Straits of Malacca.142 This is a natural choke point in which the US 
maintains an almost constant presence.143 Indeed, Singapore, a strong US ally that sits in the 
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middle of the Strait, has recently modernised Changi Naval Base, making it one of only a few bases 
in the Pacific large enough to berth a US aircraft carrier. 144 This ongoing source of concern for 
Beijing is most frequently referred to as the ‘Malacca Dilemma’ and, having a navy that is capable 
of keeping this SLOC open in the event of terrorism or blockage by a third party is a major thrust of 
naval modernisation in China.145 China’s territorial claims, and their defence, are the third element 
in the economic motivations. China’s claims in the South China Sea are often pointed to as a likely 
source of hydrocarbons in the future. If this turns out to be the case, they will help to reduce 
China’s reliance on oil and natural gas transhipped through the Straits of Malacca.146 However, in 
order to establish a favourable outcome in these disputes, China needs to have a navy that can 
defend its claims and prevent another state establishing control of islands and atolls that China 
considers its own. China’s actions and strategy in the South China Sea will be addressed in greater 
detail later in this paper. Finally, the expansion of the Chinese economy has led to a massive 
expansion in Chinese foreign business and investment. The result of this is large numbers of 
Chinese nationals living and working overseas. After its failure to contribute to the 1991 Somali 
evacuation, it has been recognised that the PLAN needs to have the capability to evacuate these 
overseas workers if required.147  All these motivations can be attributed to China’s search for 
security in its territory, trade, and for its citizens, wherever they may be.  
The use of the PLAN to evacuate Chinese citizens is not the only humanitarian motivation behind 
Chinese naval modernisation since 1996. The 2004 Boxing Day tsunami which devastated parts of 
Indonesia, Malaysia and many other states, demonstrated the soft power value of naval forces. 
The deployment of US aircraft carriers to the region, as well as the transport and warships of 
numerous other nations, provided a major public relations boon to these states. This was a benefit 
that China largely missed due to it navy’s inability to react rapidly and with the right type of ship 
for humanitarian relief.148  Beijing recognises the benefit of having a navy capable of rapidly 
conducting humanitarian relief operations, and so this has also fed into its modernisation efforts. 
As can be seen, the motivations behind the modernisation of the PLAN and other PLA forces 
associated with maritime security are centred on guaranteeing the security and interests of China. 
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This concept of security includes ensuring China’s territorial integrity, something which puts it in 
competition with other states. For many US commentators, it is China’s insistence on ensuring 
Taiwan continues to be part of one China, that is the hardest to swallow. But whether you believe 
Taiwan should be independent or not, the more important point is that China sees it as part of the 
state, and any threat of it breaking away is a threat to the security of the state. To a slightly lesser 
degree, other territorial disputes fall into the same category, that they are internationally 
contested is less important to Chinese motivations than the fact that China sees them as being its 
territory. As well as the territorial threats to the state, China also sees the need to defend its 
growing interests, including citizens overseas, and the trade lanes that supply the materials to 
further China’s economic growth.  
New Historic Missions 
Chinese strategy is not unresponsive to the changes in the international environment and its own 
position in it. The Chinese reaction to these changes has taken the form of “new historic missions” 
for the PLA. The missions were first put forward by President Hu Jintao in a December 2004 
speech, formally titled “historical missions of the armed forces for the new stage in the new 
century”.149 The new historic missions are: 
“(1) providing an important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its ruling 
position, (2) providing a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of important 
strategic opportunity for national development, (3) providing a powerful strategic support 
for safeguarding national interests, and (4) playing an important role in safeguarding world 
peace and promoting common development.”150 
The new historic missions demonstrate the Chinese leadership’s conclusion that global stability 
and prosperity is a determinant factor in China’s economic and national development, and so adds 
the goal of securing China’s economic development to defence priorities. 151 The new historic 
missions have both an internal and external security component, however, internal security is not 
a major role for the PLAN and so will not be discussed here. The missions continue to place the 
security and stability of the regime at the forefront of the PLA’s missions, and even those tasks 
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that have an external bent have a regime security motivation, as any external conflict will drain 
resources needed for domestic reform and stability. Military publications have specifically 
identified the escalation of territorial disputes and conflict over Taiwan as possible sources of 
conflict in what has otherwise been identified as a period of strategic opportunity for China’s 
economy based on a stable international environment. These publications envisage that the role 
of a strong Chinese military will not be to solve disputes through the use of force, but to deter 
other states from challenging the status quo.152 These new historic missions are in line with the 
expectations of defensive realism. The Chinese government has identified that it is seeking 
security rather than power, building up its military only in so far as it allows China to continue its 
economic development and maintain its territorial integrity. In identifying global stability as a key 
to continued domestic growth the New Historic Missions also show that the Chinese government 
are not pushing for the type of regional hegemony portrayed by offensive realists as any such 
moves would be grossly destabilising and harmful to domestic interests.   
Sources of Chinese Military Equipment 
Now that motivations behind the modernisation of the PLAN have been discussed, this paper will 
look at how this modernisation has taken place. This will be done by looking at the foreign and 
domestic sources of military hardware for the PLA; what the composition of the modern PLAN 
fleet is, including supporting units such as aircraft of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF); as well as how the 
PLAN has sought to improve training and professionalism within the service. The development of 
China’s paramilitary maritime forces will also be examined, as these are playing an increasingly 
important role in many of China’s maritime disputes. Finally, the modernisation of the PLAN and 
supporting units will be compared against two of its neighbours, Japan and Vietnam, in order to 
gain perspective on China’s military growth. China’s naval building programme is driven by a real 
need to modernise an otherwise largely obsolete fleet. However, the growth of its para-military 
fleet is one of the most problematic aspects of China’s increasing focus of maritime security.  
China’s indigenous shipbuilding industry constructs almost all of the PLAN’s ships, and in the area 
of civilian shipbuilding it is world leading. The Chinese government has recognised the strategic 
nature of a domestic shipbuilding industry, and so has a stated intent to support and develop the 
sector; their goal was to have the country become the world’s largest shipbuilder by 2015, a goal it 
                                                            
152
 Fravel, "Economic Growth, Regime Insecurity, and Military Strategy: Explaining the Rise of Noncombat Operations 
in China," 187. 
DEFENSIVE REALISM AND CHINESE MARITIME STRATEGY  
39 
 
actually achieved in 2010.153 Chinese shipbuilders have leveraged lessons learnt from interactions 
with foreign shipbuilders to improve their research, development, and production process which 
have had benefits for military projects.154 Shipbuilding was one of the first areas of China’s 
economy to move towards a market based system. The China State Shipbuilding Corporation 
(CSSC) was created in 1982 as one of the first corporatized areas of China’s state run economy. 
This was then divided into the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) and CSSC in 1999, 
with facilities divided between the two on a roughly north-south basis respectively. These are 
further divided into several shipyard group companies who bid for work on an individual basis 
rather than as part of the parent corporation. This division at corporation and company level 
creates a degree of competitiveness not found in other Chinese defence industrial sectors.155 
However, for all the competitiveness and improvements in Chinese shipbuilding, it still lags behind 
in several areas which are exacerbated by the demands of military projects. Project management, 
inefficient production methods, and an inability to develop or absorb advanced production 
technologies are all weaknesses exhibited in the industry.156 A RAND study on the Chinese defence 
industry picks out particular concerns for defence production: 
“Chinese naval shipbuilders still need to import key components or modules, such as 
propulsion systems, navigation and sensor suites, and major weapon systems, to outfit 
these vessels. Such a reliance on imported subsystems creates systems-integration 
challenges, as well as security concerns stemming from dependence on foreign 
suppliers.”157 
The continued reliance on imported components is a significant liability for the PLAN, however 
overseas equipment purchases also have benefits for both the PLAN and the domestic defence 
industry.  
The acquisition of foreign defence systems has allowed China to field a navy that has capabilities 
beyond what its own domestic industry is able to produce. While China once acquired military 
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equipment from Western sources, an arms embargo placed on China by the USA and European 
governments as part of the backlash against the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre halted any 
trade. Israel was another source of advanced equipment for the PLA, but a reform of Israeli export 
laws in 2007 halted this trade as well.158 This made Russia one of the few states from which China 
could purchase advanced military hardware. For the two decades following the Tiananmen 
Incident, China purchased between one-fourth and one-half of all Russian military exports. These 
purchases helped modernise the PLA and also provided revenue to Russian firms that were no 
longer receiving large orders from the Russian military.159 China’s most advanced conventional 
submarines and destroyers were purchased from Russia and each equips the most advanced Anti 
Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) in the Chinese fleet.160 Russia also sells complete aircraft, anti-ship 
missiles, and air defence systems to China, though the number of complete systems sold is 
steadily decreasing as Chinese industry catches up. The import of defence equipment by the PLA 
has allowed for rapid advances in Chinese capabilities, without having to shoulder the research 
and development costs.161 However, as domestic technological ability continues to improve 
Chinese purchases has been limited to upgrades or specialised technology where Russian industry 
maintains an advantage. No complete warships have been ordered since 2005.162 As well as the 
importation of complete systems from foreign sources, China also purchases a range of dual-use 
technologies from countries that include the US and Europe. This includes precision machine tools, 
diagnostic and forensic equipment, and computer aided design applications.163 Overseas 
purchases have helped China to close capability gaps and acquire advanced capabilities rapidly 
and at a lower cost than indigenous development.  
China also acquires defence technologies through means that are less legitimate. Reverse 
engineering and industrial espionage continue to play a role in the modernisation of the Chinese 
military. Reverse engineering has been an issue that Russia in particular faces with its extensive 
sales of equipment to China. Chinese submarine production, particularly of the new Yuan-class, is 
thought to be heavily influenced by the lessons learnt from China’s Kilo-class submarines. China 
has also put Russian weapons systems into production in China with only slight modifications in 
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order to avoid paying licensing costs. 164 Industrial espionage is the other method that the Chinese 
government has used to acquire advanced technologies for the defence industry. Russia has 
prosecuted both civilians and military personnel for attempting to sell technology and weaponry 
to Chinese buyers, though it has refrained from prosecuting the Chinese nationals implicated in 
such cases.165 Industrial espionage is conducted through both traditional intelligence operations 
and the hacking of computer systems of defence ministries, researchers, and manufacturers.166 
Reverse engineering and espionage allow China to shorten research and development times for 
advanced technologies.167 
While previously China’s domestic production of warships had to be augmented by the purchase 
of ships from Russia, continuing indigenous development, aided by reverse engineering and 
industrial espionage, has allowed China to rely entirely on its domestic industry. However, China 
continues to rely on foreign suppliers for specialist components which is a real liability for the 
PLAN.   
The Modern Fleet 
In order to understand the current trajectory of the PLAN, it is important to understand the 
current state of the PLAN and what its capabilities are. For the purposes of this paper I will discuss 
six areas: surface combatants, submarines, amphibious support vessels, anti-ship ballistic missiles, 
aircraft, and aircraft carriers. While this does not cover the entire range of ships in the Chinese 
fleet, these are the most important vessels to the combat and force projection capabilities of the 
PLAN. An in-depth knowledge of the submarine tenders, inshore patrol craft, and fleet 
replenishment vessels is not required to follow this papers argument, suffice to say that like all 
other areas of the Chinese military, these vessel types are also being modernised.  
Nine new, indigenously produced classes of destroyers and frigates have entered service with the 
PLAN since the early 1990s. The new destroyers surpass the older Luda-class ships, which began 
service in 1971, in terms of hull design, propulsion, weapons and sensors. The classes are named 
Luhu, Luhai, Luyang I, Luyang II and Louzhou. However, only thirteen of these ships have entered 
service with the PLAN since production began in 1994. This slow rate of construction may indicate 
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that the PLAN is incrementally developing technology in each new ship before committing to serial 
production.168 By way of comparison, the US Navy has commissioned 63 of its Arleigh Burke-class 
destroyers since 1991.169 In addition to these, the PLAN also has four Sovremenny-class destroyers, 
which entered service between 2000 and 2006. Four new classes of frigates have entered service 
with the PLAN. The classes are two iterations of two designs; Jiangwei I and II, and Jiangai I and 
II.170 The new frigates surpass the older Jianghu-class in both hull design and systems, including 
anti-air capabilities. The Jiangwei II and Jiangkai II have gone into larger scale production, and 
Jiangkai II frigates are still being produced.171 These new vessels have moved the PLAN from a 
large fleet of single-mission platforms to a reduced number of more capable and sophisticated 
multi-mission platforms.172 , Chinese ship construction has not replaced the majority of the fleet’s 
older ships. The percentage of modern surface combatants in the fleet was still only 25% in 
2010.173 Projections for the Chinese fleet out to 2020 actually see a decrease in the number of 
frigates and a stable number of destroyers. However, the capability of the fleet will improve as 
older ships are replaced with more modern and capable vessels.174  
Anti-surface warfare has been a particular focus for the PLAN, both for the surface and submarine 
forces. The surface warfare force is also seeking to improve its air-defence capability in order to 
lessen its current dependence on land-based air cover. Anti-submarine warfare is a lesser priority 
for the PLAN but has not been without progress as well, though this is mostly limited to coastal 
defence against other regional states diesel submarines, rather than combating US SSNs.175 The 
ASCM of modern Chinese surface combatants are a substantial improvement over older vessels. 
The SS-N-22 Sunburn ASCM of the Sovremenny-class, coupled with Mineral-ME over-the-horizon 
targeting radar, has a range of around 130 nm. The Luyang II-class carries the domestically 
developed C-602 ASCM with an estimated range of 120nm, and other surface combatants 
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(including frigates) carry the C-802 which has a range of approximately 65nm.176 Area-air-defence 
is the most notable area of improvement in the fleet. The range of ship borne surface-to-air 
missiles (SAM) has increased from about seven nm to between 12 and 80 nm (depending on the 
system type) in the space of a decade. The continuing development of the PLAN fleet is evident in 
that four different SAM systems operate within the modernised fleet, of both Russian and Chinese 
design. These new SAM systems rely on advanced air-surveillance phased-array radar systems, 
such as the Russian Tombstone and Top Plate, and the domestically produced Dragon Eye. These 
new systems give the PLAN surface fleet the ability to engage enemy aircraft before they can 
launch anti-ship missiles. A single ship can now also take responsibility for the air defence of a 
surface formation, increasing efficiency.177 China’s anti-submarine warfare capability continues to 
be the greatest area of weakness of the PLAN. This has been put down to the high cost of the 
required platforms and equipment, and the large amount of training time required to master this 
capability.178 This is an admitted flaw that the PLAN is attempting to overcome through the 
purchase of tools such as modern anti-submarine helicopters and also through the use of anti-
submarine mines. These mines are seen as a low cost and effective method of preventing enemy 
submarines entering the first island chain in the event of a conflict.179 The development of surface 
warfare capabilities within the PLAN has been substantial, but it is important to remember that 
most of these advances are restricted to the 25% of the surface fleet that are modern, multirole 
vessels.   
The increased capability of the PLAN is also seen in its submarine fleet. This fleet has conventional, 
nuclear powered attack, and nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines. The conventional 
submarines of the Chinese Navy are one of the key capability areas that author James R. Holmes 
points to in a Chinese access-denial strategy.180 As with the surface forces, the PLAN is shifting 
from large numbers of old and low capability submarines to a smaller number of high capability 
boats. All of these modern submarines have improved weaponry, larger magazines, are quieter, 
and benefit from improved computer systems.181 China’s twelve Russian built Kilo-class 
submarines are the most advanced conventional submarines in the fleet, with the two Yuan-class 
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boats being the most advanced indigenously produced conventional submarines.182 Slightly older 
are the thirteen Song-class submarines, which entered service in 1999. These new submarines are 
superseding the 23 Romeo and Ming-class submarines in the fleet, submarines still based on 
Soviet designs from 1959.183 The Ming-class submarines demonstrated their obsolescence in 2003 
when all hands aboard submarine 361 died from asphyxiation due to a mechanical failure.184  This 
incident resulted in the PLAN’s commander being relieved of command and being replaced by 
Admiral Zhang Dingfa, a submariner himself.185 The Song, Kilo, and Yuan classes have advanced 
anti-ship cruise missiles and torpedoes, and it is rumoured that the Yuan-class may have an air-
independent propulsion system.186 In the area of nuclear powered submarines, China has three 
new classes that are entering services. Shang-class SSNs have been entering service at a rapid rate, 
two being commissioned in the past decade, with a possible total of five to be produced.187  
Retired U.S. Rear Admiral Eric McVadon takes this as a sign that the class has a particular utility in 
any Taiwan conflict scenario.188 There are also plans for an additional class of SSN, the Type 095, 
and this will take China’s nuclear attack submarines from the second generation Shang’s into third 
generation technology, with improvements in quietening and mission capability.189 In the area of 
ballistic missile submarines, China is finally developing a credible second strike capability after the 
failure of the Xia-class SSBN. The Jin-class is currently under production, and the PLAN is likely to 
acquire five of these platforms.190 However, there have been problems with the JL-2 ballistic 
missiles, which the Jin’s are meant to be equipped with, delaying the class from entering 
service.191 The submarine fleet of the PLAN is one of the areas undergoing the most rapid 
modernisation. Any discussion of the Chinese submarine fleet is incomplete without a discussion 
of the acoustic qualities of these ships, which determines how difficult they are to detect. The 
simplest way to show this is a chart that appeared in a US Office of Naval Intelligence report in 
2009 (Figure One). It shows progress in Chinese submarine development but that it still lags 
behind Russian and US designs.192 This leads to the conclusion that while China is improving its 
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submarine forces, this is due to a real need to improve the force from outmoded designs. But even 
this improvement still leaves its submarines, and particularly nuclear powered ones, behind those 
of the US and Russia.  
 
Figure One: “The People’s Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics,” 22. 
The possibility of a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan has meant that the amphibious warfare 
vessels of the PLAN are of real importance in an analysis of the fleet. While the number of 
amphibious ships in the PLAN’s amphibious fleet has remained stable, the quality of the ships has 
improved. New classes of Landing Ship Tank (LST) and Landing Ship Medium (LSM) have replaced 
more vintage units, offering improved sea keeping and reliability, as well as greater endurance and 
troop capacity.
193
 However, these new ships have not significantly increased the Chinese 
amphibious lift capacity from one infantry division.
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 The first Yuzhao-class landing platform dock 
(LPD) amphibious transport ship entered service in 2008. Two or three more are to be constructed, 
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though some reports state that a total of six will be built. While similar in appearance to the new 
San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ships of the US Navy, the Yushao class displace only 
17,600 tons compared to the San Antonio’s 25,900 tons. Like many of China’s new vessels, its 
design appears to incorporate stealthy design features such as clean and sloped sides.195 With a 
large flight deck, the Yuzhao class is ideal for humanitarian assistance missions, an important 
mission for the PLAN. The PLAN also has two Type 920 hospital ships which contribute to this 
capability.196 There are rumours that a landing helicopter dock type (LHD) ship displacing 20,000 
tons will be built for the PLAN, but this has yet to be confirmed.197 The construction of an LHD by 
China would likely garner much attention due to LHDs having a similar appearance to an aircraft 
carrier. 
The onshore weapons systems of the PLA are also of importance to the PLAN and Chinese naval 
strategy. The most obvious in this regard is the aircraft carrier killing ballistic missile, the Dong 
Feng 21, D variant (DF-21D). The DF-21 is a medium range ballistic missile that first entered service 
in 1991 and is China’s principal regional nuclear missile.198 The DF-21D is properly described as an 
anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) and is thought to have a range of 1,500km.199 In order to engage 
enemy ships with such a weapon the target must be detected and identified, this would likely be 
achieved by satellite reconnaissance. This would be augmented by air or naval patrols, over the 
horizon radar and electronic surveillance. Satellite based radar on its own may not be sufficient, as 
carrier sized ships such as super tankers or cruise ships are relatively common, and the detail 
required from a satellite to distinguish the target can be prevented by inclement weather.200  Once 
a target has been identified, the missile is launched and heads on a ballistic trajectory until its 
manoeuvring re-entry vehicle activates, using optical and radar sensors to guide the warhead onto 
its target.201 On impact, the warhead will be travelling at 3,500 metres per second and will impact 
with a force equating to 5% of that given off by the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima. On its 
own, the kinetic energy would do sufficient damage to a carrier size target to prevent it carrying 
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out additional missions (referred to as mission-kill) and the addition of 600kg of explosive in the 
warhead may be enough to sink it.202 Whether the DF-21D can actually hit a US carrier cruising at 
30 knots, at a range of 1,500 km, has yet to be proven, but the fact that the PLA appears to have 
the capability to perform this task already has significant implications for navies operating within 
range of this system.203  
The other land based systems that are of significance for PLAN strategy are aircraft. The PLAN Air 
Force (PLANAF) is the air arm of the Chinese navy and is responsible for maritime strike and air 
cover for ships at sea, as well as operating the PLAN’s ship based helicopters. As well as the 
helicopters and combat aircraft themselves, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C), anti-
submarine warfare and tanker aircraft are also part of a total PLANAF fleet of over 800 aircraft.204 
The fighter fleet comprises of the indigenously produced J-8, which entered production in 1979, 
but has undergone significant modernisation in the past two decades , and the Su-30 Flanker, a 
fourth generation multi-role fighter purchased from Russia between 1992 and 2002.205 The latest 
batch of Flankers has an extended range and the advanced AS-17 Krypton air-to-surface missiles, 
which together will allow it to fulfil a maritime strike and air-to-air role.206 China’s maritime strike 
aircraft fleet has expanded and improved since 2000 when the fleet was only about 40 JH-7 
fighter-bombers and H-6D bombers. The JH-7 fleet today numbers around 80 and has been 
upgraded to accommodate more advanced ASCM and radar systems, and the H-6D fleet has also 
doubled.207 Five H-6 airframes have been modified to act as tankers allowing Chinese aircraft to 
extend their operating ranges, and this will be complemented by eight Il-76 Midas tankers ordered 
from Russia.208 While the aerial refuelling capability will extend the range of the PLANAF’s most 
advanced Flankers out to 5,200km with a single refuelling, most other aircraft in the fleet are not 
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equipped for aerial refuelling which severely limits aircraft ranges.209 Several Y-8 (the Chinese 
variant of the Antonov An-12) and IIyushin IL-76 airframes have also been modified to serve as 
AEW&C aircraft, named the KJ-200 and KJ-2000 respectively.210 Most of the new Midas tankers 
and AEW&C aircraft will be operated by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) but will play an important role 
in naval air operations nonetheless.  The aircraft that China relies on for maritime strike and air 
cover have grown in both number and sophistication, but as will be seen later in this section it is 
not alone in the region in taking these measures.  
The most talked about item in the Chinese fleet is its new aircraft carrier. The ship, a Kuznetsov-
class aircraft carrier formally named the Varyag, has been undergoing refit since 2005 and 
undertook its first sea trials in August 2011 before finally being handed over to the PLAN on 23 
September2012.211 It has been named the Liaoning in honour of the province in which it 
refurbished. The ship is not in and of itself a major step up for the PLAN’s capabilities, but is a 
powerful indicator for the future of the Chinese fleet. A US Department of Defence report states 
that the Liaoning will only “offer a limited operational capability”212 beyond its evaluation and 
training role, and this will only be achieved after several potentially costly years of training which 
have a high likelihood of deaths and loss of aircraft.213 What makes the Liaoning important is that 
it shows the Chinese’ desire to have an aircraft carrier force, and the Liaoning is likely to be joined 
by as many as three indigenously produced carriers.214 This number makes sense as it should allow 
China to have a carrier at sea at all times, however the issue of enough vessels to support the 
operation of these carriers is a significant one for the PLAN. Nan Li and Christopher Weuve suggest 
that China will construct short take off but assisted recovery (STOBAR) type aircraft carriers as the 
PLAN’s evaluation and training will have all been gained onboard Liaoning, itself a STOBAR type. 
The aircraft which China is producing for aircraft operations are also based on those used by 
Russia on its STOBAR aircraft carriers. Like the Liaoning, Chinese aircraft carrier are likely to be 
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medium sized and conventionally powered, which will be sufficient to launch aircraft capable of 
providing air cover to the fleet but with only limited surface attack capability.215 The PLAN initially 
sought to source aircraft for the carrier from Russia and had been negotiating the purchase of 50 
Su-33 Flanker-Ds, Russia’s in-service carrier jet fighter, however negotiations fell through based on 
China’s violation of licensing on the Su-27SK.216 China is now producing its own version of the Su-
33 (named the J-11) which is based on Su-33s purchased from Ukraine in 2004, and this is the 
most likely jet fighter to operate from Chinese aircraft carriers.217 There are major concerns about 
the Chinese constructing aircraft carriers, and this is particularly due to the perception that the 
PLAN has no need for an aircraft carrier force. Japan and the USA have expressed apprehension, 
and the lack of transparency in Chinese military strategy and acquisitions will do nothing to 
alleviate these concerns.218 As this design of carrier will only serve to provide air cover for the 
PLAN its offensive capabilities are not as great as some would predict. It will not be as capable as 
U.S. aircraft carriers at projecting force and so can be seen as more defensive in nature. However 
the acquiring of aircraft carriers can still be seen to fall outside the strict requirement of a security 
seeking state in China’s position, which either makes it an indication of a different strategy or, 
more likely, a lack of consideration of the actual strategic need for the procurement of this type of 
ship.  
Training and Professionalism 
The modernisation of the PLAN goes beyond platforms and weapon systems, with the Chinese 
navy also undergoing steps to improve the quality of training and professionalism.  Without the 
ability to operate and maintain its equipment, the PLAN will not be able to become a modern 
force. Training has also been recognised one of the most important ways of raising combat 
effectiveness in peacetime.219 An improvement in the training of PLAN personnel begins with 
improvements in the recruitment and retention of personnel. In order to develop quality 
personnel the PLAN recognises a need to move away from a conscript based force, and 
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recruitment is now geared to attract a higher quality of recruit.220 The development of a 
professional non-commissioned officer (NCO) corp has also been a priority over the past one and a 
half decades. NCOs are the backbone of a modern navy, providing leadership and technical 
expertise to the fleet ,as well as helping to retain quality enlisted personnel.221 40% of the PLAN’s 
personnel are now NCOs, and they account for 65-80% of the enlisted personnel on board ships, a 
result of changes in recruitment made in 1999 that moved away from a majority conscript force.222 
Officer training is also undergoing a shift, with the number of college graduates entering the 
service allowing the PLAN to cut things like basic literacy from the training regime, a section 
required when recruits came from rural peasant backgrounds.223 A programme similar to the US 
Reserve Officer Training Corps has also been established to expand the recruitment base of the 
navy.224 Senior officers are also required to undergo postgraduate study and professional military 
education in order to advance in rank, and a move towards assignments in joint roles as a 
requirement for promotion have been suggested for the near future.225 However, these 
improvements in training within the PLAN still leave it behind other modern navies such as Japan, 
Taiwan and South Korea, particularly in technical expertise. This is partially due to the diverse 
range of equipment, indigenous and foreign, that the PLAN operates. It is telling that even in 
peacetime the Chinese Navy struggles to repair its most modern Russian built combat systems. 
Sea time for PLAN vessels is also significantly less than other modern navies, particularly long 
range cruises, which are still considered note worthy events.226 Modernisation of the recruitment, 
retention and training within the PLAN has yet to fully come to fruition, but will continue to 
improve the calibre of PLAN personnel.  
There has also been a generational change with the CCP and the PLA that has resulted in a more 
concrete division between civil and military spheres of government. For previous generations of 
Chinese leaders, experience in combat or roles linked to the revolutionary military were a 
prerequisite for high office, whereas the current leadership of the CCP and China is almost entirely 
civilian with no experience in military roles. This means that while previous leaders felt they had 
the knowledge and authority to intervene in military decision making processes, current leaders 
look to the military as a source of expert advice. This in turn is a role that military leaders can fulfil 
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as they have been promoted based on their competence and professional knowledge, though 
political reliability and connections still play a role. They also have no standing outside of the 
military which they can use to interfere in political matters.227 However, Nan Li states that the 
separation of civil and military powers may have implications for crisis management. The previous 
unity of political and military leadership in the form of Mao or Deng allowed swift and decisive 
action in crises without institutional hindrance, but recent events such as the 2001 collision of a 
Chinese jet and a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft, the 2004 intrusion of a PLAN submarine into 
Japanese territorial waters, and the 2009 harassment of the USNS Impeccable, show that this is no 
longer the model which the PRC operates under. These, and other incidents, demonstrate a lack of 
coordination between the PLA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), shown by the long 
periods between incident and resolution or explanation.  228 This division between the civil and 
military explains in better terms the conduct surrounding such incidents, with such actions being 
unintended rather than representative of the unified will of the Chinese government seeking to 
maximise its power. 
Para-Military Marine Agencies 
The PLAN is not the only organisation that the Chinese government is modernising in order to 
address maritime security issues. China has several maritime agencies that patrol its waters, as 
well as disputed territory such as the South China Sea. The State Oceanographic Administration 
(SOA), China Marine Surveillance (CMS), Maritime Safety Administration (MSA), Border Control 
Department, Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC), and Coast Guard all operate their own 
fleets of patrol craft and aircraft, and all of these agencies have received greater funding and 
modernised fleets since the 1990s.229  The FLEC will take delivery of five 3,000 tonne vessels in the 
next five years to augment its current fleet of 135 ships, which includes only nine vessels over 
1,000 tonnes and a large number riverine patrol craft. While these vessels are ostensibly for 
fisheries patrol, some FLEC ships are equipped with machine and anti-aircraft guns.230 The US 
Department of Defence has characterised the growth of the FLEC and other civilian agencies and 
their growing role in maritime surveillance as an effort by the Chinese government to shift 
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perceptions of territorial disputes from military rivalries to a law enforcement issue.231 This would 
make sense in light of the increased funding for the MSA and CMS, which operate unarmed vessels 
that are thus less threatening to other states. These agencies are controlled by the SOA and 
operate in a law enforcement role, despite their safety and surveillance titles, undertaking patrols 
of disputed waters in the East China Sea.232 Ships of these civilian agencies, as well as fishing 
trawlers, are often at the centre of incidents in the South China Sea, such as the USNS Impeccable 
incident and the cutting of a Vietnamese survey vessels cables within Vietnamese waters in May 
2011.233 In an article by James C. Bussert, it is claimed that China also has 300,000 fishing trawlers 
organised into a maritime militia that can be utilised for harassment of foreign vessels. The 
argument that average fishermen “do not ram foreign coast guard vessels”234 is a strong one, and 
it is likely that the PLAN, civilian agencies, and whoever are crewing these harassing trawlers are 
coordinating their actions, particularly when several vessels concentrate on a single ship. The SOA 
operates in three regional branches that are collocated with the respective PLAN headquarters, 
indicative of the close ties between the two organisations.235 As the PLAN continues to grow so 
will these organisations, providing the Chinese government greater flexibility in their patrolling 
and actions in disputed waters, shifting disputes into a legal rather than military sphere, and 
allowing for enhanced surveillance of maritime territory.  
Regional Trends 
China is not the only state that is investing in the modernisation of its military forces. However 
China’s own investment is a driver behind other states spending, and this has feed back into a 
security dilemma in the region. While numerous states are engaging in military modernisation, this 
paper will look at two states; Japan and Vietnam. Japan has had to react to the rise of China as a 
threat to the balance that the US has maintained in the region, and with particular suspicion, as 
the US has continued to engage with China.  Vietnam on the other hand, has had a long standing 
rivalry with China, but does not have the same economic muscle as Japan to invest in its military. 
Both countries have maritime territorial disputes with China which have led to confrontations at 
sea. Japan has one of the largest and best equipped militaries in the region, though its budget 
never surpasses 1% of GNP and has constraints on weaponry and operations placed on it by the 
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constitution.236 The Japanese Air Self Defence Force (JASDF) is seekeing to modernise its 
interceptor fleet, and to that end, the government has made numerous enquires about purchasing 
the advanced F-22 Raptor air-superiority interceptor from the US.  The F-22 would have given the 
ASDF the capability to outclass Chinese Su-27, J-10, and JF-17 fighters. However, there is currently 
a congressionally mandated embargo on foreign sales of the aircraft and US officials have 
expressed concerns about the effects on the regional balance of power of such a sale. 237 In 
December 2011, the Japanese government settled on the purchase of 42 F-35A Joint Strike 
Fighters to fill the role.238 The Coast Guard has been expanded, in part, as a way to circumvent the 
1% defence spending limit. This organisation now has a military role explicitly banned by its 
authorising legislation and has a freer set of rules around the use of force than the Japanese Self 
Defence Force (JSDF). As of 2005, the Coast Guard boasted a fleet of 145,000 aggregate tonnes, 
which equates to 60% the tonnage of the PLAN’s surface fleet. By 2007 this had already increased 
to 237,000 aggregate tonnes.239 The Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) is also to 
receive six new Aegis destroyers and has received two Hyūga-class helicopter destroyers. The 
Hyūga-class displaces 13,000 tonnes and can carry a compliment of 11 helicopters, making them 
ideal for anti-submarine operations and military operations other than war.240 The JMSDF also has 
the most advanced diesel-electric submarine fleet in the region which is consistently kept at the 
leading edge of technology.241 While this is only a small portion of the procurement projects 
currently underway by the Japanese military, it can clearly be seen that the Japanese Self Defence 
Force (JSDF) is modernising its forces in similar areas to the PLA, and in some cases, in response to 
developing Chinese capabilities.  
Vietnam is another state that is undertaking a modernisation of its military forces, and there has 
been a particular focus of air and maritime forces. One of the interesting aspects of Vietnam’s 
modernisation is that it relies on the same arms producer as China, namely Russia. Vietnam has 
committed to increase its defence budget by 70% in 2011, a clear statement of its intent to 
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modernise its military.242 The purchase of six Kilo-class submarines from Russia was announced in 
late 2009, which will vastly increase the size and capability of the Vietnamese submarine force 
which currently consists only of two North Korean manufactured mini-subs.243 The Vietnamese 
navy has also taken delivery of two Gepard-class frigates and three Tarantul V-class corvettes 
(with a further seven on order), all Russian manufactured.244 Vietnam is also upgrading the 
capability of its air force, which, until the 1990s, was comprised of a large number of Vietnam War 
era aircraft. In the 2000s Vietnam added Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft to its inventory, though exact 
numbers are in some dispute in the literature. Richard Bitzinger states that a 2009 order will add 
twelve new Su-30MKKs to a current Vietnamese fleet of eight Su-27s and Su-30MKKs, while 
Richard Bitzinger states that the 12 Su-30MKKs will add to the nine Su-27s built in the early 1990s 
and 12 Su-30MKKs.245 This is by no means a complete look at the modernisation of these two 
states armed forces, but it is intended to show that China is not the only state in the region 
engaging in a modernisation of its forces. It also seeks to highlight competition in air and naval 
forces. The proliferation of submarines in the Asia-Pacific in particular is a trend that has been 
remarked upon by Sam Bateman in a 2011 article.246 So while China has the largest defence 
budget in the region and receives the lion’s share of attention, it is not the only state expanding 
and upgrading its forces.   
The reasons behind the expansion of the Chinese Navy and other maritime agencies is therefore a 
far more nuanced process than simply trying to build up forces to push the US out of the region 
and secure hegemony for China. The origins of China’s renewed maritime focus come from factors 
such as the Taiwan crisis and a desire to protect the heart of its economy, its coastal regions, from 
possible attack. Further to this, China has identified its own security concerns through the new 
historic missions, with a focus on continuing economic growth through secure sea lanes.  These 
were threats that the Chinese navy was incapable of addressing, and so it has required a major 
modernisation effort for the fleet. Even after decades of modernisation, the Chinese navy’s fleet 
continues to have large numbers of ships that are obsolete technologically, and this fact will see 
the fleet actually reduce in size as a smaller numbers of high quality ships enter the service. The 
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modernisation of the PLAN is therefore necessary if the China is to have a force that can confront 
the security challenges that it has identified. Weapons like the anti-ship ballistic missile are a 
method of making up for this lack of naval capacity. The growth of China’s paramilitary 
organisations and how these craft interact with those of other states that have competing 
territorial claims is one of the key concerns to arise from China’s naval modernisation and will be 
addressed in a later section.  Finally, by looking at the growth of other states militaries, it is clear 
that China is not the only state expanding and improving its forces. There is a security dilemma 
developing within Asia, and while China continues to develop its forces, and there is little reason 




















While China has been engaging in a programme of modernisation of its navy from the 1990s and 
has slowly been undertaking more port visits throughout Asia, Indian Ocean, and the Pacific, it has 
recently ramped up its operations both in Asia and further afield. Anti-piracy operations in the 
Gulf of Aden were one of the first and most high profile overseas operations. The outbreak of 
violence in Libya in 2011 also saw the PLAN assist in evacuation of Chinese citizens. These two 
events drew attention to Chinese operations in a way that operations within Asia have not. 
However, these operations are also powerful indicators not only of the future of the Chinese navy 
but also the stance that China is taking as its military forces continue to grow in capability. In this 
chapter, the recent operations of the PLAN in the Gulf of Aden, Mediterranean, as well as the 
South and East China Sea, will be examined. It will look at the conduct and motives, as well as the 
benefits that China drew from these operations. There is a disconnect between the multilateralism 
and cooperation demonstrated by operations in the Gulf of Aden and the stance taken by the 
PLAN in its operations in the South China Sea, which are firmly cantered on maintaining its 
territorial claims. 
Gulf of Aden 
Piracy has been a developing issue in the Gulf of Aden since 2005, when three Taiwanese trawlers 
were captured by Somali pirates and ransomed back to the owners.247 The number of pirates 
operating in these waters has been on the increase ever since, and with it the number of ships 
that have been pirated for ransom. As well as ship owners taking action to better protect their 
vessels, there has also been a large and well coordinated response by the international community, 
authorised by the United Nations Security Council. There are two major multilateral operations 
taking place to protect shipping in the Gulf of Aden, that being the US led Task Force 151, and the 
European Union (EU) led Operation Atlantia. Under the auspices of these two groups, a large 
number of states have contributed warships. Other states, such as India, Russia, Iran, and China, 
have sent warships to the region outside of these groupings.248 The first PLAN ships were sent to 
the region in 2008 with the task of escorting Chinese owned shipping through the Gulf, which 
included shipping from Taiwan, as it is seen to be part of China. The initial task force consisted of a 
Luynag II-class destroyer, a Luyang I-class destroyer, and a Fuchi-class supply ship. These 
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represented the most modern ships in the PLAN fleet and were commanded by some of the most 
senior and experienced officers in the Chinese Navy. Prior to his appoint as commander of the task 
force, Admiral Du Jingchen had been the Chief of Staff of the South Sea Fleet.249 This tendency to 
assign only the most advanced ships, commanded by senior officers, after meticulous study and 
even rehearsals, is a reoccurring feature of overseas operations by the PLAN and has raised 
questions about the ability of the PLAN to conduct operations at short notice.250 Initially, the PLAN 
took a cautious and independent approach to the operation, to the extent that only Chinese 
replenishment vessels made any visits to local ports to replenish supplies, the destroyers staying 
at sea continuously for the three months of the operation in order to avoid raining concerns in the 
region (Western ships usually have a port call every 10-14 days).251 China did not participate in 
information sharing or patrol coordination programmes, focusing solely on protecting Chinese 
flagged vessels. This changed in January 2010, when China indicated it would participate in Shared 
Awareness and Deconfliction (Shade) meetings as a co-chair, as well as assigning its forces to 
patrol a designated area of responsibility in the Gulf of Aden. By participating in Shade and moving 
to a patrol, rather than escort mission, China significantly changed the nature of its involvement in 
the anti-piracy efforts from a sole effort, to being part of a coordinated effort.252   
There are several important motives behind China’s initial participation and then the change in the 
nature of its participation in anti-piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden. The first and most obvious 
motive is the protection of Chinese trade transiting the region. 1,200 Chinese vessels pass through 
the Gulf of Aden ever year, representing one-third of China’s seaborne trade.253 Protecting 
Chinese trade is important for the continued economic development of China, and this, as well as 
the collective security elements of the mission, fits neatly within the PLA’s new historic 
missions.254 The Chinese government was also faced with the need to assuage public opinion after 
a fishing trawler was captured in November 2008, and a month later a tanker was attacked and 
only avoided capture when a Malaysian military helicopter intervened. Bloggers began expressing 
frustration that the PLAN, which had been presented to them as a modern and capable force, was 
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incapable of protecting Chinese interests.255 Many authors also note the training benefits of 
conducting anti-piracy missions at such a great distance from the Chinese mainland, however Erik 
Lin-Greenberg notes that the PLAN was initially reluctant to commit forces to the operation, and 
participation was driven by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).256 The interest of the MFA in the 
participation of Chinese forces in anti-piracy operations was likely driven by another benefit, 
presenting China as a responsible and engaged great power. The deployment is authorised by 
several United Nations Security Council Resolutions giving it legitimacy, and shows China’s military 
in a role that serves to dispel some of the China threat assertions.257 In changing the approach 
from an independent operation to coordination with Shade, the Chinese government had to 
consider the overall effectiveness of the operation. Two warships and a replenishment ship could 
not hope to protect all Chinese trade. Indeed, the hijacking of another vessel, a bulk carrier in 
October 2009, was soon followed by Chinese moves to fully participate in Shade.258 By 
participating in the multilateral programme, China could now achieve its goals of waving the flag 
and protecting Chinese trade, without the threat that any attack on a Chinese vessel would be 
identified as a failure by the Chinese government.  
The anti-piracy patrols undertaken by the PLAN have had several benefits, both to the 
organisation and to China’s reputation, but it is important that authors are realistic about the type 
of mission that the Chinese navy is undertaking in the Gulf of Aden and what it actually tells us 
about the PLAN. The deployment has clearly had training benefits for the Chinese navy, any 
operations undertaken by naval forces do. These benefits have been in the areas of navigation, 
seamanship, under-way replenishment and equipment operation.259 The PLAN has been given a 
unique opportunity by the deployment to practice these tasks at a great distance from the 
mainland, without generating the negative reaction or suspicion that it would otherwise would.260  
The PLAN has also used the deployment to test its most advanced indigenously produced ships, 
sending only these ships to the Gulf.261 It is important that these training benefits are not 
overstated though. The Gulf of Aden deployment is not a rehearsal for SLOC protection mission 
against a conventional adversary; protecting shipping against poorly armed pirates is not the same 
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as protecting it against a conventional threat operating under, on and above the water. Yung et al 
point out that the training benefits for those ships completing the deployment comes at the cost 
of time that could be spent training for conventional combat operations, and so could be seen to 
hinder some other areas of training.262 Even replenishment at sea experience is of limited use in a 
scenario such as conflict with Taiwan, as the island is close enough to the mainland for this not to 
be needed for operations. As well as training, there are some other benefits for the PLAN. The 
Chinese ships almost certainly undertake some reconnaissance of other warships, however this is 
not in excess of what any other nation would undertake in such a setting. It has also given the 
PLAN experience in operating in a multilateral environment, initially operating near to other 
warships, and now operating in coordination with them. The only major deficiency that the 
deployment has shown, is the limited number of fleet replenishment ships in the Chinese fleet, 
which led to the need for civilian vessels to be brought in to support the operation.263 This 
deficiency would become more acute in combat operations, and so is an area that the PLAN will 
need to address if it wishes to further develop its blue-water capabilities. 
Libya 
One of the key unintended benefits that came from the deployment of PLAN ships to the Gulf of 
Aden was that the Chinese government had forces in a position to assist with the evacuation of 
Chinese nationals from Libya after violence broke out in the country in February 2011. The Libyan 
uprising was one of the first tests of the PLA’s ability to respond to the needs of a Chinese 
population that has gone out into the world as part of China’s go global strategy.264 It also 
represented an opportunity for the PLAN to demonstrate the developments in its capabilities since 
its failure to provide any support to the evacuation of Chinese nationals from Somalia in 1991. On 
27 February, the Jiangkai-II class guided-missile frigate Xuzhou entered the Mediterranean after 
transiting the Suez Canal. The Xuzhou was in the region as part of the anti-piracy patrols in the 
Gulf of Aden and had recently resupplied in the port of Salalah in Oman, so was able to redeploy 
quickly to the Mediterranean.265 The frigate was dispatched to aid in the Chinese government’s 
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response to the deepening crisis in Libya, which resulted in the evacuation of 35,000 Chinese 
nationals by chartered and military aircraft, as well as chartered merchant vessels and overland 
buses.266 The frigate arrived off the coast of Libya on 1 March where it took up escort on the 
chartered Greek ferry El. Venizelos and its 2,141 Chinese passengers, the final Chinese chartered 
ferry to leave Libya. The ferry was already about half way through its journey to the port of 
Heraklion on the island of Crete.267 After completing its escort mission, the Xuzhou then returned 
to continue anti-piracy patrols. It was the first ever deployment of a Chinese warship into the 
Mediterranean Sea, and as such, led to some alarmist media reporting and conjecture. The British 
newspaper The Daily Mail’s online edition published an article titled, “After Beijing sends a frigate 
to the Med, a leading author poses a chilling question... How long until a Chinese aircraft carrier 
sails up the Thames?” 268 
The deployment was not a harbinger of an expanded global role for the Chinese navy. It did show 
both a logical, though in practice largely symbolic, response by the Chinese government making 
the best use of PLAN assets in the region. The evacuation was conducted in a fairly permissive 
environment, the no fly zone and bombing campaign by NATO led forces had yet to begin, 
meaning that foreign warships were not yet a target and there had been no moves by the Gaddafi 
regime to prevent the evacuation of nationals, but China’s dispatch of a warship was similar to the 
actions of many other states. The USA, UK, France and Canada all dispatched warships to assist in 
evacuations, and Russia had requested a Turkish naval escort for its own ferry chartered for 
evacuation.269 The Chinese government was then operating along best practise for such a situation. 
It was also in a historically unique position to dispatch a warship to the region. Only because there 
were warships conducting anti-piracy patrols in the region, were the PLAN able to provide this 
support, otherwise the nearest warship would have been in Asia and unable to provide support in 
a useful timeframe. However, the Xuzhou appears to have only been off the coast of Libya for a 
very short period of time and escorted only the final transport of Chinese nationals, with Chinese 
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chartered ferries already having made the trip from Libya to both Malta and Crete.270 Another 
possible motive for the dispatch of a Chinese warship, intelligence gathering, would have been of 
limited value in the end, due to the fact that combat operations by NATO led forces had yet to 
begin. The combat firing of weapons, such as the Tomahawk cruise missile and the radar and other 
electronic traffic that precedes it, would have been useful intelligence to gather, but the Xuzhou 
departed the Mediterranean long before this occurred. What the mission did provide was a clear 
demonstration to the Chinese public that the PLAN now had the word wide reach that they 
expected of their navy and that the Chinese government would use it to protect them in a time of 
need. Pictures of the PLAN frigate escorting the El. Venizelos, as well as those of PLAAF II-76 
transport planes moving into the region, played well in domestic media. New reporting of the 
evacuations emphasised the unprecedented nature of the operation, the role of the military in it, 
as well as the leading role of the CCP in organisation at a government level and with party 
members on the ground.  As a demonstration of China’s commitment to protecting its citizens 
working overseas, the operation was an overwhelming success and may well set a precedent for 
future civilian evacuations by the PLA. Any future PLAN involvement in these operations would be 
dependent on the presence of Chinese warships in the vicinity, and with the Gulf of Aden mission 
being the only regular deployment of warships outside of its region, this leaves large areas of the 
globe out of range.   
Exercises 2010 
While China completes high profile operations in the Gulf of Aden and Mediterranean, it continues 
to conduct extensive exercises closer to home. All military organisations conduct such exercises, 
but the nature and scope of the PLAN’s exercises have clearly changed since 2010. In 2009, there 
were no exercises by the PLAN in the Pacific and no exercises of note in the South China Sea. Some 
exercises were conducted with Russia as part of the anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, but 
these were limited in participation to the ships that were in the area.271 This would change 
dramatically in 2010 when the Chinese Navy undertook a series of exercises that were 
unprecedented for the force. In April, a flotilla of 16 ships, consisting of units from all three of 
PLAN’s fleets, came together for an exercise. Initially this exercise was reported as two separate 
exercises, however it now appears that this was a single larger exercise, and while this paper will 
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address the events as a single exercise, it is important to note that some ambiguity remains. The 
exercise consisted of live fire exercises and confrontation drills along the Chinese coast, practising 
repulsing air, sea and submarine attacks launched against the flotilla. The fleet then sailed within 
140km of Okinawa and through the Bashi Channel which separates Taiwan and the Philippines, 
and visited Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands.272 It was the first time that such a large Chinese 
force had come so close to Japan. The exercise gained media attention when a helicopter 
operating from the PLAN flotilla flew within 90 metres of a JMSDF destroyer, one of two Japanese 
warships that began following PLAN ships as they approached Okinawa.273 The exercise was also 
the first time that ships from the East and North Sea Fleets had operated in the South China Sea, a 
powerful demonstration of China’s ability to deploy forces to the region if needs be. The inclusion 
of ships from all three fleets may also signal that China is moving away from the current and 
outdated system of three independent fleets (South, East, and North) towards a central command 
structure. This was one of four major exercises that were conducted by the PLAN during 2010. The 
second was held in early July in response to the US-South Korean exercises that were themselves a 
response to the sinking of the Cheonan by North Korea.274 The third was a large and domestically 
well reported live fire exercise conducted by the majority of the modern ships in the PLAN in July.  
This exercise came only three days after The US made an offer to facilitate a multilateral dialogue 
between those claimants on territory in the South China Sea during the 17th Association of South 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF).275 The timing was certainly precipitous, and the 
organisation of the exercise to coincide with the ARF is a possibility, though three days is far too 
little time to organise an exercise so it was not a direct response to US moves. The fourth was an 
amphibious landing exercise held in November.276 These exercises showed both China’s 
confidence in undertaking long range operations and the willingness of China to use exercises to 
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China conducted further exercises in the Pacific Ocean in 2011. A Chinese flotilla passed between 
the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Miyako in June, like the exercises conducted the previous 
year. The JSDF reported to the media on 8 June, that a total of 11 PLAN ships transited the waters 
around Okinawa in three groups over two days. Submarines were also believed to be 
accompanying the group, and the presence of a submarine rescue ship would seem to confirm 
this.277 There is little additional information on the nature of these exercises, except that the 
Chinese Ministry of National Defence stated that the exercise was to last from “mid to late 
June”278. Pictures of the Chinese warships were released by the JMSDF. The pictures show three 
Sovremenny-class ships, two Jiang Wei I and two Jiang Wei II frigates, as well as a tug, intelligence 
collection ship, submarine rescue ship and supply ship.279 The Japanese Defence Minister 
expressed concern about the passage of the vessels, as the ministry had for the 2010 exercise.280 
On 18 June it was reported that China had conducted a three day military exercise in the South 
China Sea. The exercise came immediately after the Vietnamese Navy concluded its own live fire 
exercise in the South China Sea, and at a time of increased tension with other states claiming 
territory in the South China Sea, particularly the Philippines.281 In November 2011, the Chinese 
defence ministry announced that the PLAN would again conduct exercises in the Pacific, showing 
the PLAN’s continuing growth in confidence conducting these exercises.282 It has been noted in 
media reports that the 2011 announcement came soon after the conclusion of a Pacific tour by 
President Obama, during which he and Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced that the 
US would station marines in Australia from 2012 with involvement by Japan. The tour was seen as 
a restatement of the US’s role as a Pacific power, reassuring the USA’s allies in the region. 
However, such an exercise takes extensive planning and so it is unlikely that the announcement 
was a trigger for it.  
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What have we learnt? 
The operations off the coast of Somalia and Libya are indicative of the operations that the Chinese 
Navy is likely to undertake in the medium term. The deployment of ships to the Gulf of Aden was 
largely driven by China’s foreign ministry rather than the PLA itself. It was an operation that 
allowed China to be seen as a responsible actor, pulling its weight in a UN sanctioned operation. It 
was not controversial, and played well with domestic audiences. The operation to evacuate 
Chinese nationals from Libya was only possible because ships were in the region supporting anti-
piracy operation and was of limited practical utility but useful as another good news story for the 
Chinese domestic audience. Tasks like that in the Gulf of Aden are rare, and the likelihood of China 
maintaining ships so far from its region is unlikely to occur again in the long term. However, where 
there are PLAN ships in a region which suffers humanitarian disaster, or where Chinese citizens 
require evacuating its citizens, we can expect PLAN involvement. This is not at all different from 
the operations of other navies. It is too soon to state that the PLAN is now in a position to help 
defend China’s interests in Africa. First, assuming that China would military intervene in such a 
situation, the distances are too vast for the PLAN to play a timely and meaningful role.  The PLAN’s 
foreign operation will therefore be limited to military operations other than war, and will be 
dictated by foreign policy goals and domestic factors, rather than defence needs or strategic 
considerations. 
The past two years have been unprecedented for the PLAN in terms of exercises, and there are 
several important implications for both the capabilities of the Chinese Navy and Chinese foreign 
policy. In the area of capability, the exercises showed improvements in the ability to project force 
into the second island chain. China is making real strides into the second island chain, which is 
bordered by “the Kuril, Bonin, Mariana and Caroline Islands in the Pacific”.283 The most challenging 
aspect of such exercises is not keeping the forces supplied, but the coordination of the 
deployment of submarine, surface, and air elements. The exercises show that the modernisation 
of the PLAN is beginning to provide it with substantially improved capabilities. However, the 
classes of ship that are being used in these exercises tend to be only the most modern in the PLAN 
fleet, which reinforces that China still has some way to come in developing a fully modern naval 
force, retiring outdated platforms such as the Luda class destroyers and Jianghu class frigates. The 
nature of the exercises concluding in the South China Sea also shows that the PLAN has the ability 
to reinforce its territorial claims and bring large forces into the vicinity of the important sea-lane of 
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the Straits of Malacca.284 This links closely into the foreign policy implications and outcomes of the 
PLAN’s exercises since 2010. Demonstrating the ability to defend China’s claims on the South 
China Sea is a clear policy objective of many of these exercises, however there is also a backlash 
caused by these exercises which undermines the show of force. As the PLAN demonstrates its 
capabilities fully, and often provocatively, this causes other parties in the South China Sea dispute 
to revaluate their own defence needs in the face of Chinese capabilities, and in many cases drive 
them to seek assistance from the US. By exacerbating the security dilemma in the region, China 
comes no closer to resolving territorial disputes. Perhaps the best explanation may be that the 
exercises appeal to the domestic audience in China and seek to show that China is standing up for 
its territorial claims. The long-range aspects of the exercises are less politically sensitive in some 
regards. While the Japanese government have expressed concern about the proximity of Chinese 
warships to Okinawa, the PLAN was well within its rights to sail in those waters and the Japanese 
government has no legal right to complain. It also remains a fact of geography that PLAN vessels 
have to travel near to some other country to enter the Pacific, and Japan’s southern islands form a 
large part of this barrier. The exercises south of Taiwan look to be part of PLAN training for a 
possible conflict with Taipei, but most Chinese exercises implicitly have this as a goal, so it is not 
extraordinary. The pace and nature of the PLAN’s exercise, and in all likelihood their controversy, 
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INCIDENTS AT SEA AND THE LINK TO TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 
Incidents at Sea 
The South China Sea has been a consistent area of importance for the PLAN. In order to defend its 
claims on the area, the Chinese navy and paramilitary maritime forces actively patrol the South 
China Sea, in addition to exercises in the area. While these are of a largely non-threatening nature 
there has been a visible shift in Chinese operations in the past four years. This shift is usually 
placed as starting with what is now known as the USNS Impeccable Incident. While this is certainly 
not the first incident of Chinese harassment of US ships or aircraft, Oriana Mastro stated in a 2011 
article that the 2009 incident was the “most significant confrontation to date”.285 There have been 
numerous other incidents following this in the South and East China Seas and between Chinese 
vessels and the civilian, coastguard, and military vessels of other states. It is important to note 
some of these incidents do not involve PLAN vessels, instead harassment of foreign vessels is 
undertaken by some combination of Chinese paramilitary naval forces and civilian fishing trawlers. 
However, as has already been stated, the commands of these forces are collocated with PLAN 
commands meaning that while a PLAN ship may not be present, they are not occurring without 
PLAN knowledge. These incidents are a major factor in Chinese maritime operations, interactions 
with other claimants on the South China Sea, and other disputed territories.  This section of the 
paper will look at some of the major incidents that have taken place between Chinese and foreign 
ships, the implications of these incidents to relations in the region, and what these tell us about 
Chinese maritime strategy.  
Submarine Incidents 
The first incidences this paper will examine are those between US ships and Chinese submarines. 
These incidents pre-date the Impeccable Incident but are important in what they tell us about 
China’s submarine forces, the acoustics of the Chinese coast line, and the resulting discussion in 
the USA. In October 2006 in waters near Okinawa, a Song-class submarine surfaced within torpedo 
firing range of the US aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, having evaded detection by the carrier’s 
protective screen. This took place while the commander of the US Pacific Fleet was making a visit 
to China to promote military exchanges between the two countries.286 The incident resulted in a 
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certain amount of soul searching about the decline in US anti-submarine warfare capabilities since 
the end of the Cold War, as well as the rise of China’s submarine forces.287 On 11 June 2009 these 
themes came up again when the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS John S. McCain’s towed sonar 
array was run into by a Chinese submarine in the South China Sea.288 These submarine encounters 
demonstrate advances in the capability and number of some Chinese submarines. However, any 
submarine operating within the first island chain is difficult to detect due to the shallowness of the 
waters, which means that sound waves created by the submarines cannot travel as far.289 This 
geographic advantage to submarines may lessen the accomplishment of China’s submarines in 
these two instances. Such incidents may actually become more common place with an increase in 
both US and Chinese naval activity likely in the coming years. 
Impeccable Incident 
The Impeccable Incident is interesting not only for the confrontation itself but also for the 
different interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that 
led to it. The ship USNS Impeccable is a US ocean surveillance ship operated by the Military Sealift 
Command under its Special Missions Programme. It is unarmed and manned by a civilian crew.290 
The USNS Impeccable is a platform for the Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS) 
with a Low Frequency Active (LFA) add-on. These systems are designed to detect quiet diesel and 
nuclear submarines, and are particularly effective in littoral environments where the detection of 
submarines becomes more difficult.291 The incident occurred on 8 March 2009, in the South China 
Sea, seventy-five miles south of China’s Hainan Island.292 It involved five Chinese vessels: a Navy 
intelligence collection ship, a SOA patrol vessel, a Bureau of Maritime fisheries patrol vessels, and 
two Chinese flagged trawlers.293 The two trawlers manoeuvred aggressively and in close proximity 
to the US vessel, at one point blocking the ships path and forcing it make evasive manoeuvres to 
avoid a collision. The trawlers also attempted to snare the towed array of the Impeccable. The 
crew of the Impeccable eventually resorted to the use of fire hoses when one of the trawlers came 
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within sixteen metres, but this failed to deter the Chinese sailors who then stripped to their 
underwear and brought their vessels as close as eight meters to the US ship.294 This went on for 
two hours until the Impeccable was able to leave the area. The destroyer USS Chung-Hoon was 
then sent to escort the vessel and the Impeccable was able to resume its activities the next day 
with the Chung-Hoon providing protection.295 The confrontation was the climax of a series of 
actions to harass the US vessel, including low altitude flyovers, shining of spotlights, crossing close 
in front of the vessel at night, and bridge-to-bridge calls which stated that the Impeccable’s 
operations were illegal and that it had to “leave the area or ‘suffer the consequences’”.296 Before 
discussing the legal arguments on both sides of the incident, it is important to note that the 
actions of the Chinese trawlers violate numerous laws of navigation at sea and put both their own 
lives, and those of the sailors on the Impeccable, at risk. 
China insists that the USNS Impeccable was undertaking actions that violated international law. 
Chinese officials insist that the vessel was within Chinese waters and that it was engaged in spying. 
A former vice-commander of the PLAN, Vice-Admiral Jin Mao, insisted that “The Chinese ships 
were exercising their legal rights,” and that there was “nothing wrong” with the response of the 
Chinese ships.297 U.S. officials on the other hand, state that the Impeccable “was conducting 
routine operations in international waters.”298 Both sides site UNCLOS as proof that they are in the 
right, though the Chinese also site domestic law, and to some degree, both are disingenuous in 
their claims. The US claims that its vessel was in international waters, however there is no such 
thing as international waters under UNCLOS. As Mark Valencia points out according to UNCLOS:  
“there are internal waters, territorial waters, the exclusive economic zone and the high 
seas, each with their own regime regarding freedom of navigation. “International waters” 
is a term used by the US Navy to indicate areas where it thinks it has unconstrained 
navigational freedom.”299 
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Furthermore, the US is still to ratify the convention, although it does recognise most of UNCLOS as 
binding customary law.300 The Chinese arguments that the US vessel was violating international 
law is also incorrect as there are protections within UNCLOS that allow military vessels to conduct 
exercises in another states exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including intelligence gathering.301 An 
article by Ji Guoxing on the incident, a flawed piece which tries to apply territorial water rights to 
China’s EEZ among other errors, also tries to argue hypocrisy on the part of the US, as the US 
would not allow intelligence collection in its own EEZ.302 However China does conduct intelligence 
gathering activities in the EEZ of other countries, including US Pacific territories, making such 
claims moot. Furthermore, claims that the Impeccable was violating Chinese domestic law also fall 
flat due to the fact that Impeccable is a military vessel and therefore has sovereign immunity.303 
However, China maintains its own view of how the freedom of the seas operates in areas that it 
lays claim to, and whether they are legal or not, these need to be understood.  
China’s interpretation of UNCLOS gives coastal states greater control over activities within its EEZ 
than the interpretation of the US and other states, creating a fundamental difference between the 
US and China. In the US interpretation, the EEZ does not belong to the coastal state, but is an area 
where the coastal state has “sovereign rights and jurisdictions for economic purposes and all 
states enjoy high seas freedoms”.304 China, as well as Brazil, India, Malaysia, Uruguay and Pakistan, 
have all issued declarations that UNCLOS does not authorise states to conduct military exercises in 
an EEZ without permission of the coastal state.305 China declared, as part of its ratification of 
UNCLOS in 1996, that the PRC has “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” over its EEZ. In June 2009 this 
was further clarified, as the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it was an offence under 
international and domestic law for military vessels to enter China’s EEZ without China’s 
permission.306 Such a claim hinges on an interpretation of UNCLOS that is at odds with the 
convention and its negotiating history, but this remains China’s interpretation and so is important 
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for understanding incidents at sea within China’s claimed EEZ.307 What is more, it is the policy of 
the US government to operationally challenge such claims and interpretations of freedom of the 
seas under the Freedom of Navigation Programme, and so US Navy vessels will continue to 
operate within China’s EEZ.308 China attempts to avoid claims of hypocrisy in its own naval conduct 
because while it conducts military activities inside the claimed EEZ’s of other states, it claims much 
of this territory as its own. However, this argument that China abides by its own interpretation can 
be seen to be false through Chinese collection of intelligence from within the EEZ of US 
territories.309 This differing interpretation will continue to be a matter of friction, particularly 
between the US and China, and is further exacerbated by competing and overlapping territorial 
claims made by China and it neighbours.  
Harassment of Vietnamese and Philippine Vessels 
The relationship between China and Vietnam has been in decline as the two states compete over 
their respective claims in the South China Sea. This heightened dispute can be traced to 
Vietnamese efforts to develop offshore oil and gas resources beginning in the mid 2000s, efforts 
which China opposes as they take place in disputed waters.310 On 26 May 2011, three Chinese 
maritime surveillance vessels approached, blocked and threatened a PetroVietnam vessel which 
was undertaking seismic surveys 116 miles off the Vietnamese coast. One of the Chinese vessels 
then cut the exploration cables of the Vietnamese vessel, halting operations as the ship was 
repaired. China claimed that the exploration was occurring in an area under its management, and 
the Vietnamese claim it was occurring in an area neither under Chinese management nor under 
disputed claim.311 Two weeks later a Vietnamese exploration vessel was harassed by a Chinese 
vessel again, this coming at the same time as Vietnamese protests over Chinese threats against its 
fisherman operating near the disputed Spratly Islands.312 China has also maintained a policy of 
issuing diplomatic protests against Vietnamese attempts to develop offshore oil and gas fields, 
issuing eighteen objections in 2006 and 2007.313 Fishing and oil exploration ships from the 
Philippines have received similar treatment from Chinese vessels in the South China Sea. Manilia 
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accused Chinese forces of intruding into its territory six times between February and June 2011, 
and firing shots on one of these occasions.314 Chinese aircraft have buzzed Filipino fishing vessels, 
and Chinese fishing vessels have been chased from Philippine controlled waters by Philippine 
warships. Like Vietnam, the Philippines has reacted to these incidents by increasing its defence 
budget, with a particular focus on its navy and air force.315 These actions by Chinese vessels, 
particularly PLAN ships, are part of the increasingly assertive actions by China in the South China 
Sea. Coupled with Chinese diplomacy that insists negotiations on territorial disputes be conducted 
only bilaterally, these actions have raised concerns throughout the region.  
China’s South China Sea Dispute 
The leading area of friction between China, its neighbours, and Asia’s leading power, the USA, is its 
claims in the South China Sea. Parts of the South China Sea are claimed by the People’s Republic of 
China, the Republic of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines.316 The 
PRCs claim to the South China Sea is by far the most extensive and encompasses almost the 
entirety of the sea. The claim was first delineated by the now infamous ‘nine dashed line’ on a 
map produced by the Kuomintang Government in 1947. There is still some uncertainty as to 
whether China claims all the territory within this line or if it claims all the islands with the line, and 
the territorial sea and EEZ that would be attached to these. A claim based on the islands would 
include much, but not all of the area within the nine dashed line.317 China bases its territorial claim 
on historic grounds which they claim reach back over two thousand years.318 By this account, the 
Chinese claim was first established by an expedition sent to the region of the Spratlys in 110 AD. 
From the 12th to 17th century occasional references were made to the islands in historic records, 
however establishing an actual historic claim to the island is confused by the Confucian tradition of 
expressing territory through “zones of influence rather than definite linear boundaries”.319 While 
China has maintained its claim to the territory since 1947, it was formalised in 1992 by China’s Law 
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on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.320 Islands in the South China Sea are occupied by the 
PRC, ROC, Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia, and some states have also built structures on reefs 
that are submerged at high tide, or at all times, despite these points having no associated claim to 
territory under UNCLOS.321 China has fought over its claims in the past, with a 1988 engagement 
between South Vietnamese and Chinese naval forces near the Spratly Islands resulting in the 
deaths of 70 Vietnamese sailors. China then occupied and militarised reefs in the island group.322  
China’s claim on the South China Sea again show its differing view of UNCLOS, though in this case 
China stands on its own with views that are at odds with any other treaty member. The method in 
which China wishes to address the competing claims seeks to make the best use of China’s 
dominant position over the other claimants. China insists that all discussions over the future of the 
South China Sea be conducted bilaterally and outside of the dispute resolution process outlined by 
UNCLOS.323 Any moves by other claimants or outside parties such as the USA or the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to internationalise and multilateralise the dispute have been 
dismissed by Chinese officials. The vice-foreign minister of China has stated that the US should 
stay out of the dispute as it is not a claimant state. This was in response to US Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton’s statement that the US has a “national interest” in the South China Sea, and offered 
to facilitate talks between the claimants.324 China has offered to suspend claims on the South 
China Sea and undertake joint development of hydrocarbon resources. Other claimant states have 
rejected this offer, as within joint development is an implicit acknowledgement that China has a 
legitimate claim on that territory.325 There have been two agreements signed on the dispute 
between China and ASEAN members, the November 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in 
the South China Sea, and the July 2011 Implementation Guidelines. These agreements are 
intended to build towards a legally binding code of conduct for the parties in the dispute built 
upon initial self-restraint. While there have been no new occupations of islands and reefs under 
dispute, there continues to be reinforcement of those areas already under occupation, and states 
continue to take unilateral measures to strengthen their hand in the dispute.326  
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It is clear that China is heavily invested in its claims in the South China Sea, as are the other 
claimants. There are a number of factors that make the South China Sea such a valuable area to 
the claimants generally, and China specifically. One of the most sited factors in the dispute is the 
presence of hydrocarbon deposits in the South China Sea. For all the claimant states the revenue 
that would come from oil and gas deposits would be welcome, and for China it would help 
alleviate the need for importing oil and gas from other areas through waterways like the Straits of 
Malacca which it feels can easily be closed by outside actors.327 Interestingly, a 2011 article by Nick 
Owen and Clive Schofield has challenged the existing assumption that the South China Sea is a rich 
source of hydrocarbon, stating that reserves of oil in the region do not offer significant changes to 
regional energy security, though natural gas reserves could extend the regions supplies through 
the medium to long term. Nevertheless, any reserves will likely be fiercely contested regardless of 
their size.328 Fisheries are another area of importance in the dispute for control of islands in the 
South China Sea. China’s claim to the area would give it control of the fisheries in the EEZ that 
comes with them.329 The area is also a vital shipping lane for China, and this importance links into 
China’s worries about the Straits of Malacca. Chinese control of the South China Sea would push 
China’s territory into a strategically advantageous proximity to the Strait, and developing the 
islands in the sea could aid in Chinese power projection to prevent any closing of that vital sea 
lane.330 The other consideration for Chinese policy makers in the South China Sea is nationalist 
sentiment within China. The Chinese public is continuously told of China’s return to the status of a 
great power and the modernisation of its military forces. This has fed into powerful nationalist 
sentiment which wishes to see issues such as the Taiwan, the South China Sea and other territorial 
disputes settled in China’s favour. As the stability and survival of CCP rule in China is the primary 
focus of the Chinese leadership and the military, this is no minor factor in Chinese actions. And not 
only are the public nationalistic, but so are the foreign policy makers themselves.331 As a matter of 
territorial and economic importance, as well as importance to regime stability and survival 
through the impact of public sentiment, the South China Sea is a vital area for China and this 
importance informs the attitude of Chinese foreign policy makers.  
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Japan and the Senkaku Islands  
China also has ongoing territorial disputes with South Korea and Japan, though these disputes are 
conducted with a tact that differs to that seen in the South China Sea. The most notable incident 
between China and Japan in territorial disputes is the collision of a Chinese fishing vessel and 
Japanese coast guard vessels near the disputed Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyu Islands in 
China, in 2010. The Chinese vessel rammed into a coastguard vessel after it failed to respond to 
demands by two Japanese Coast Guard vessels that it leave what Japan claims as its territory.332 
The vessel was escorted to Okinawa and the captain was arrested and prosecuted for the collision, 
while the crew was released and flown back to China. The incident resulted in fierce reprimands 
from Chinese officials and public protests in China, and the Chinese government went as far as 
halting exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan and arresting three Japanese nationals accused of 
entering a military zone until the dispute was resolved.333 In the end, the captain of the vessel was 
released in an apparent back down by the Japanese government and in the face of right-wing 
protestors who wished to see a stronger stand against China. While this particular incident may 
not have been a coordinated challenge like the Impeccable incident, subsequent incidents in the 
area have involved Chinese military aircraft and vessels. Two Chinese Y-8 aircraft came within 
50km of the islands on 2 March 2011. The Japanese Defence Ministry reported that one of the Y-
8s was an ‘intelligence’ variant and the other an antisubmarine patrol variant, and F-15 jets were 
scrambled in response.334 Since that event there have been 11 reported instances of Chinese 
vessels that have approached the Senkaku Islands but did not enter Japanese territorial waters, 
and one occasion in August 2011 in which Chinese fishery patrol vessels entered Japanese 
territorial waters briefly.335 This testing of Japanese resolve and challenging their claim to the 
islands is similar to the what China is undertaking in the South China Sea, with the one caveat that 
the strength of the JSDF ensures that China cannot use intimidation or confrontation in the same 
way as with the Philippines or Vietnam.  
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South Korea  
The disputes between South Korea and China involve undersea rocks, despite the fact that 
UNCLOS states that no state can claim an undersea rock. The first rock is known variously as the 
Socotra rock, Leodo in Korean, and Suyan Rock in China. China and South Korea claim possession 
of the rock as they believe it lies within their EEZ. South Korea completed construction of a 
scientific research station on the rock in 2003 which resulted in protests from Chinese officials, 
however the Chinese protests did not refer to any claim of its own.336 The issue between China 
and South Korea came up again in July 2011 when South Korean workers began efforts to raise a 
bulk carrier that sunk near the rock three months earlier. Chinese patrol vessels entered the area 
to try to halt work but left when South Korean Coast Guard ships approached, and Chinese 
airplanes have also conducted surveillance patrols over the facility.337 China and South Korea also 
have claims on the Gageo (Korean) or Rixiang (China) Reef. On 13 December 2011 Chinese media 
stated that a maritime surveillance vessel was being sent to patrol the area near the reef, as well 
as the Socotra Rock.338 This came only days after the captain of a Chinese vessel illegally fishing in 
South Korean waters stabbed two South Korean coastguardsmen who were attempting to seize 
the vessel. One of the coastguardsmen died as a result of his injuries and this lead to diplomatic 
protests by South Korea, as well as public outrage. South Korea seized over 490 Chinese vessels in 
2011 as a result of illegal fishing, and clashes between South Korean authorities and the fisherman 
can often be violent.339 While not part of the territorial dispute, it has not helped the relationship 
between the two countries. However, the most limiting factor in resolving this dispute is that 
China has not specified the area that it claims in the East China Sea. South Korea uses an 
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equidistant line to define its claim in the seas between itself and China.340 Until China makes clear 
its claim, there cannot be a settling of this dispute.   
Japan, South Korea and China  
The disputes between China, South Korea and Japan are informative for China’s other disputes 
due to the very different nature of the conduct of these disputes. While there have been violent 
incidents in both cases, these have been unlike the coordinated incidents that have occurred in 
the South China Sea. Where Chinese military vessels or aircraft have moved into disputed territory 
that are under the control of either Japan or South Korea, it appears that these units leave soon 
after being challenged by the controlling states armed forces. This is likely due to the fact the 
China does not enjoy the preponderance of power over South Korea and Japan than it does over 
its western neighbours, and so cannot violate these countries sovereignty with impunity. In both 
the South and East China Sea the prospect for a resolution for territorial disputes looks unlikely in 
anything but the long term. As already stated, nationalism has a large part to play in China’s 
territorial claims and has led to a situation where compromise is unacceptable to nationalist public 
sentiment, and where those responsible with forming Chinese strategy share that sentiment.341   
So why now? 
It is clear that China has been active in the maritime territory that it claims, particularly in the 
South China Sea. However the singular question remains why, starting with the Impeccable 
Incident, has China become so much more assertive in its territorial claims? It is likely that rather 
than being part of the same strategy, China’s actions against US military vessels and other 
claimants to territory are results of two separate motives. From a Chinese perspective, China has a 
legitimate claim to areas such as the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea. A motive for the 
more active and confrontational approach to its claims, particularly in the South China Sea, is that 
China’s ratification of UNCLOS in 1996 has made such assertions of jurisdiction necessary to 
maintain a strong claim to the territory.342 Any move by other claimants to assert control of 
territory in the South China Sea must be visibly opposed by China, and this includes exploring for 
hydrocarbons which implies ownership of the territory involved. Large and active paramilitary 
maritime organisations help to assert that, but at the cost of antagonising other claimants. The 
appearance of heightened Chinese activity, particularly in halting exploration for hydrocarbons, 
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may be a combination of a need to assert jurisdiction and increasing activity by other states. As 
China moves to assert control, so other claimants react, taking their own actions to assert 
sovereignty and the ability to defend what is perceived as their territory. We have seen that a 
security dilemma is underway in Asia in terms of the modernising of military forces, and this same 
process will drive competition in territorial claims.  China’s active and aggressive stance in 
asserting claims to territory, particularly in the South China Sea, can therefore be put down to the 
results of the ratification of UNCLOS and the development of a security dilemma as states in the 
region seek to defend their claims through the assertion of jurisdiction and resource rights. As the 
PLA continues to modernise, the military advantage China enjoys over other states in the region 
will continue to grow, allowing China to defend its claims (or capture the territory, depending on 
perspective). Recent exercises also contribute to China’s effective assertion of jurisdiction over the 
islands, as well as deterring other claimant states from taking actions that go too far outside of 
established agreements. China can therefore be happy with a strategy that maintains its claims 
but will not bring a solution to the disputes in the short or even medium term.  
The second aspect of the post Impeccable Incident is China’s interactions with militaries outside of 
the region, predominantly the US. So why is it that the USNS Impeccable was harassed, and why is 
China sensitive to this presence? Lezyk Buszynski proposes that the reason for this sensitivity over 
US surveillance may be linked to the expansion of naval facilities at Sanya on Hainan Island, which 
is likely to base some of China’s SSBNs. Ensuring that PLAN vessels can enter and leave naval bases 
on Hainan, without threat from US forces, will also require forces based in the Parcel’s and other 
disputed islands in the South China Sea.343 To this end, the Impeccable Incident is merely an 
indicator of Chinese concerns about Hainan Island and its naval forces there, as well as being a 
result of its interpretation of its rights under UNCLOS. It is important to note that there have been 
no further incidents between the US Navy and Chinese naval forces, either civilian or military. 
Dating any shift in China’s maritime policy from this incident is therefore an exercise in US centred 
thinking and not as useful an indication as it appears.344  
There may also be a role for nationalist rhetoric and the need to show a strong hand in 
international disputes to assuage public opinion, but due to the opaque nature of Chinese decision 
making there is no reliable way to quantify its effect.  Certainly in incidences like the collision 
between a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese coast Guard vessel near the Senkaku Islands, public 
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anger and protest resulted on both sides, but it is plausible that protests were allowed in China as 
a tool of foreign policy rather than influencing the policy itself. It is therefore not a factor that can 
account for the perceived shift in Chinese maritime behaviour and strategy. 
Conclusion 
China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea as well as the Senkaku Islands and the undersea 
rocks between it and the South Korea are part of a concerted campaign to maintain Chinese claims 
on these areas. With China’s ratification of UNCLOS it is now required to assert jurisdiction and 
control of disputed areas. This comes in the form of diplomatic protests against actions such as oil 
and gas explorations, para-military maritime organisations and PLAN patrols of the areas, and 
confrontations of the ships that are undertaking seen to be violating Chinese control of these 
areas. The recent dispute between the Philippines and China at Scarborough Shoal is just another 
example of this pattern; in that case it was the Philippines that asserted jurisdiction and China’s 
move to assert its claims resulted in confrontation between the vessels of a Chinese para-military 
maritime organisation and the Philippine Navy.345 The Impeccable Incident is not indicative of this 
trend, but relates to China’s wish to defend its nuclear deterrent and other naval forces based at 
Hainan Island. These actions all reflect a Chinese policy which seeks to defend the territory that it 
perceives to be its own, seeking to ensure that any negotiations over the future of the territory 
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Understanding the trajectory of the Chinese Navy and the motivations behind the maritime 
strategy of the People’s Republic is vital in understanding the practical outcomes. Incidents at sea 
and a naval fleet of growing sophistication are the most notable of these outcomes. By challenging 
the motivations assigned to Chinese, such as offensive realism’s assertion that China has an end 
goal of establishing hegemony in its region, we can avoid policy prescriptions that are at best 
unnecessarily confrontational, and at worst dangerous. By understanding China’s policy outside 
the assumptions of a power seeking state, we gain a more nuanced understanding of Chinese 
strategy and what it means for the world. This strategy is centred on the security of the state, and 
this security includes the South China Sea and China’s claim on it.  
This paper has allowed an application of defensive realism onto Chinese maritime strategy and has 
allowed us an insight into China as a security seeking state. It has shown that the assumptions of 
defensive realism are borne out by China’s strategy and actions. China is seeking security in a 
number of areas; for a vulnerable coastline which holds the majority of its industry and economy, 
for areas that it considers its territory, and for the SLOCs vital to its economic growth. It can also 
be argued that it has sought security for its citizens overseas, but the evidence would suggest 
operations contributing to this outcome were primarily motivated by the needs of China’s 
domestic audience. Aspects of the security dilemma can be seen in the build up of China’s forces, 
as well as those of other states in the region. There are of course limits in the assertions that can 
be made about Chinese policy due to the opaque nature of the decision making process and 
military goals of the PRC, but the strong evidential base of this paper allows a fair degree of 
confidence in these findings. There are however areas of the literature that are found deficient by 
this paper. This is primarily in the area of offensive defensive balance, a theory which has not 
considered naval warfare to be of significance. As we move into a period where the USA is 
rebalancing towards Asia, and a security dilemma continues to develop amongst other states in 
the region, states that often share no land border, offensive defensive balance will be left out of 
the discussion without significant new contributions which take maritime conflict into account.      
Chinese maritime strategy and actions on the past 20 years has been clearly influenced by 
international law and affected foreign relations. From an international legal perspective it is clear 
that UNCLOS is the key piece of international law that is influencing Chinese behaviour in the 
maritime sphere. However, there is a disconnect in China’s actions as China seeks to maintain 
jurisdiction, and therefore claims to disputed territories as required by UNCLOS, but is not 
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presently interested in allowing its claims to go through the arbitration in the method set out 
through UNCLOS.  China is also in no hurry to conclude disputes in the South China Sea, due to its 
growing military advantage over the other claimant states. UNCLOS is therefore playing a role in 
the dispute, driving the actions of claimants but without regard to the dispute resolution methods 
set out in the convention.This is made worse by the differing view of EEZ rights that China and 
other states hold. China is essentially choosing which parts of UNCLOS it will respect, and this 
limits how useful UNCLOS will be to the ultimate resolution of these disputes. There are no means 
to enforce UNCLOS on China, and so the treaty will be of limited usefulness in solving these 
disputes.  
It is equally clear that China’s strategy in the South China Sea is a assertive one, though not in an 
exclusively military sense. This behaviour will continue to antagonise states, particularly Vietnam 
and the Philippines, and negatively affect perceptions of China in the rest of the world. China will 
need to balance its desire for a favourable outcome in these disputes and its desire to be seen in 
positive light, a desire which partially motivated its counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.  
The continued modernisation of the Chinese Navy is a fact of life which the world will have to 
come to terms with. With China’s fleet still consisting predominantly of aging ships, based on even 
older designs, and which have in some cases been more dangerous to the crew than any adversary, 
this modernisation is necessary to create a navy which is the equivalent of any other 
contemporary forces. China’s first operational aircraft carrier will be a significant milestone in this 
development, but it should not overshadow the other projects which will give the PLAN a 
backbone of modern surface combatants and submarines. These forces will be vital in ensuring 
that these aircraft carriers can play a viable role in conflicts without monopolising the entire navy 
for their protection. While China modernises its navy, it may be the growth of its paramilitary 
maritime organisations that is of most significance for China’s neighbours. Their patrolling of 
disputed maritime territorial and harassing of vessels from other states is a key component of 
China’s maritime strategy in these regions.  
China’s policy of challenging the actions of other states in the South China Sea is the most 
significant challenge to relations in the region. The disputes between China and Japan are taking a 
different track, and the disputes between South Korea and China are not as serious and 
confrontational as others. There is no way to close the capability gap between China and other 
disputant states. Due to China’s preponderant size and economy, no other disputant state in the 
South China Sea is ever going to be able to match it. China strategy will successfully delay any 
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settling of the dispute. China is taking a long term view of the dispute and it is likely to succeed in 
forcing states to negotiate with it on its terms. The only chance for other states to negotiate a 
settlement of the dispute, on anything but a bilateral basis on China’s terms, is a multilateral 
process through ASEAN and backed by the USA, but there are serious obstacles to such an effort. 
Claims in the South China Sea overlap with multiple states and so there are disputes between 
other disputant states, as well as with China. Efforts by ASEAN to engage with China on matters of 
security are also still limited, currently to less challenging matters such as maritime crime and 
disaster relief, and expanding them to matters of territorial sovereignty is a long way off. 346 The 
US rebalancing into the region may help to ensure China takes no overt military actions, but these 
were already unlikely as war is bad for economic growth and growth is still China’s key concern. 
The only way to ensure that China does not have its way in the dispute is therefore a multilateral 
solution, one that does not exist at present.  
So what can states in the South China Sea dispute do to prevent a settlement in the region which 
is settled bilaterally between China and other states, and therefore on China’s terms? The only 
hope to prevent this outcome is that states refuse to negotiate with China on these terms. There 
may be a temptation to negotiate so that exploration of hydrocarbon reserves can go ahead, even 
if it is on a cooperative basis; there are royalties to be earned that would be of great help to the 
states involved. The US can have a role in such efforts, reassuring allies that it supports a 
multilateral and rules based approach, while using what tools it has at its disposal to ensure that 
no state blinks first and negotiates with China. There are no realistic short term solutions to the 
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